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tution and Trade Liberalization
In almost all developing countries early stages of industriali-
zation are marked by import substitution policies., In an attempt
to improve standards of living and to enhance output growth,
indigenous industrialization was promoted by barriers against
foreign competition. Inward industrialization was further assumed
to free developing countries from their dependence on in-
dustrialized countries and to pave the way to efficiency gains
based on local technological development.
The pure economic performance of countries pursuing import sub-
stitution policies and the successes of countries following a
more outward-oriented industrialization path have cast substan-
tial doubt on the wisdom of inward-oriented industrialization
strategies. Despite the fairly obvious economic advantages of
export-oriented industrialization few developing countries have
actually changed their initial inward-oriented industrialization
strategies . This adherence of governments and politicians to
obvious non-optimal economic policies raises fundamental issues
on the determinants of economic policy-making. Yet, there are no
studies to date analyzing the economic and political roots, which
lead to the choice of a specific industrialization strategy in
developing countries.
An evaluation of the determinants influencing this choice re-
quires a theory on the determinants of political decision-making,
as it is suggested in the political economy approaches to the
analysis of political behavior. These theories assume that
economic policy-making does not reflect so much political in-
tentions but results from a rational economic calculus on the
part of politicians. It is assumed that above all politicians act
in their best self-interest, i.e. they want to maximize their
personal income by defending and enhancing their political in-
2
fluence .- 2 -
In order to remain in power they have to expose themselves to the
pressure of the electorate and interest groups. Thus, economic
policy-making is governed by pure economic considerations and the
ultimate economic effects of economic policies are only evaluated
with respect to their impact on the electorate and the behavior
of pressure groups.
This paper intends to apply a public choice approach to the tran-
sition from import substitution to trade liberalization observed
in a specific country, namely Turkey. The analysis entails an
assessment of factors that have affected the strategic choices of
the government first for import substitution and for trade
liberalization later. The focus is on the targets, the behavior
and the importance of special interest groups over longer periods
of socio-economic change in order to derive a relationship
between the prevailing political environment and the indu-
strialization strategy chosen.
In the recent literature, a variety of political-economy models
of trade-policy determination have been developed. These are
listed in Chart 1.1 .
- The pressure group model attempts to explain industry pro-
tection by the lobbying activities of respective interest
groups, as it has been discussed by Olson (1965) and Becker
(1983). Politicians serve the interests of such groups, as long
as these groups can offer political support and/or financial
rewards. Interest groups may either propose or oppose protec-
tionism depending on the preferences of their members.
- The national policy model, as it has been developed by Caves
(1976), assumes the prevalence of ideological boundaries
affecting economic policy-making. Outcomes of such policies
manifest themselves in infant industry protection, excessive
industrialization, tendencies towards autarchy, etc...Chart A.I: Typology of Political-Economy Models for Trade Policy Determination
Models of Endogenous Government Behavior
1















Note: Terminology has been taken from Quibria (1986) and Caves (1976).- 4 -
- The adding-machine model puts an emphasis on the politicians
1
attempt to affect elections by respective economic policies,
including both macro- and sector policies, as it has been dis-
cussed by Downs (1957) .
The other three approaches are supposed to be more long-run in
nature.
- According to the status-quo models current duty levels as well
as recent changes in them depend to a large extent on histo-
rical tariff levels. According to Cheh (1974), government offi-
cials, especially bureaucracies, favor the status-quo, since
they either have a certain regard for existing property rights
or prefer to be risk-averse.
- The social change model, as it has been formulated by Fielcke
(1976) and Ball (1967) considers trade policy as an instrument
for income redistribution. The extent of redistribution depends
on social inter-relationships and classes as well as social va-
lues and culture.
- And finally, the foreign policy model views the economy as a
political unit bargaining with other nations about reductions
in protection, while other countries adopt a merchantilist
attitude towards trade policy. Examples for such approaches can
be obtained from Kindleberger (1973) , Krasner (1976) and
Keohane (1984).
Most of these models have been analyzed empirically both for
4
developed and developing countries . However, quantitative models
are not capable of assessing the behavior of interest groups and
governments as well as resulting policies in their historical
context, either because qualitative or structural changes cannot
be quantified or because relevant data are missing. Empirical
investigations based on such models rely heavily on a given
socio-economic structure and hence empirical results cannot be
extrapolated beyond the sample period. Moreover, changes in these- 5 -
structures determine - according to the public choice approaches
- the import substitution or export-orientation policies.
Since the adherence to such policies may take decades, descrip-
tive analysis as applied by economic historians like North (1982)
appears to be a more promising approach. Despite its arbitrari-
ness and the lack of comparability, this approach is more likely
to reveal insights into the political economy of import substi-
tution and subsequent liberalization.
The theoretical underpinnings of this paper are based on hypo-
theses which can be derived from the pressure group, adding-
machine and social change models. Basically all policy measures
are attributed to interest groups, which may enter the political
market in three different ways.
Firstly, pressure groups can be embodied in the official instil
tutions of a country, such as the military, the bureaucracy and
corporatist intermediaries. The latter encompass organizations,
which are controlled by the government, though their membership
constitutes of members of the private sector; i.e. cooperatives
and chambers of commerce and industry. Since most corporatist
intermediaries are given administrative competence, they have
much in common with bureaucracies. For the military, bureau-
cracies and corporatist intermediaries, it is the legal framework
which provides the opportunity to exert power on the government.
Such institutions are mainly interested in enlarging both their
legal competence and their respective budgets, as it has been
assessed by Niskanen (1971) and Lindblom (1977).
Secondly, pressure groups can be associated with a political
party representing the group's interest in parliament and in the
government. Especially mass organizations prefer this way of
lobbying, as they can count on their large membership in elec-
tions. The political parties serve as intermediaries between the
government and the interest group. In democratic systems, where
costs of information are quite low, large groups do not neces-•• 6 —
sarily require an organizational form in order to make use of
their voting power.
Finally, interest groups may prefer to be independent, never
binding themselves to political parties or government in-
stitutions. Since such groups voice their interest through in-
formal channels, they have to be quite powerful in order to
achieve political benefits.
The power of interest groups, which use the latter two channels
of influencing politicians, is due to factors, which have been
assessed by Olson (1962) . The larger the membership of a group,
the more costly is it to organize an effective pressure group,
since group members' potential gains per capita are low compared
to the costs of organization. As a result, individual group mem-
bers behave as free-riders, since they expect other group members
to take over the costs of organizing. According to Olson, large
groups require more time for organizing themselves. This time
span tends to be shorter, when the group develops a group-speci-
fic ideology, as it is assessed by North (1979). Furthermore,
large groups can easier organize in a democratic environment, as
elections are the most efficient instrument for decision-making
in large groups.
In contrast, small groups have lower costs of decision-making and
organizing. This comparative advantage enables small groups to
act even within an authoritarian environment, in which elections
and rights of assembly are prohibited. Since small groups have no
considerable backing by electorates, their source of power does
not rest in the public support, which large groups can guarantee.
Small groups rather use their economic power facilitating exten-
sive public relation policies and political bribery. Hence,
interest groups have to optimize their group size, because there
is a trade-off between the costs of organization and the public
support of the group. According to Olson, the cost of organi-
zation increases at a higher rate with increasing group size than
the effectiveness of lobbying due to public support. As a result,- 7 -
smaller groups can easier prevail upon the government to serve
the interest of the group members.
In addition, large groups suffer from decision and adjustment
lags, which make it difficult for them to constitute a lobby
given the discontinuous economic and political environment in
developing countries. As small groups can adjust and act more
quickly, North (1979) and Tullock (1974) have concluded that all
major economic and political changes, such as revolutions or
changes in trade regimes, are due to the activities of small
groups.
Another factor affecting costs of organizing lies in the regional
distribution of group members. If group members are scattered
along a wide geographical area, they cannot easily communicate
and contact politicians given the lack of infrastructure in
developing countries. In contrast, groups which are located in
urban centers of the country have lower costs of communication.
For this reason powerful groups, such as business organizations
and groups of landlords, are well represented in large cities.
These hypotheses on pressure groups should also be applicable for
the implementation of import substitution and the transition from
import substitution to trade liberalization. Basically, there are
five groups, which are affected by protectionism: capital owners,
land owners, suppliers of human capital, suppliers of labor and
consumers. Since factors like capital, land and human capital are
generally very unequally distributed in developing countries,
their factor owners encompass rather small and powerful groups.
In contrast, labor and consumers are rather sizeable groups,
which are less capable of carrying through their interests.
Import substitution involves protection to more capital-intensive
goods favoring suppliers of human capital and capital, while
consumers and labor are discriminated. Capital owners, who are
represented by business groups, and human capital owners, as
organized in business groups and higher rank bureaucracies, lobby- 8 -
for import substitution, which increases their factor income.
Since small groups of capital and human capital owners can
organize more efficiently and effectively, they can push through
import substitution policies against the opposition of large
groups, i.e. consumers and labor.
However, there can also be some opposition of business groups and
landed groups since trade barriers tax export-import traders,
agricultural exporters and export-oriented producers through
higher prices for intermediate products. However, this opposition
is not effective, mainly for two reasons: Firstly, primary import
substitution is restricted to consumer goods rather than inter-
mediate products. Secondly, the implementation of import sub-
stitution is most likely to occur during a balance of paymentr,
crisis, which is due to a deterioration of export trade, as it
was assessed by Hirschman (1971) . In this situation, the export-
oriented groups are in a less favorable position to lobby for
free trade.
Thus, import substitution is a consequence of the lobbying acti-
vities of inward-oriented business groups. Evans (1979) maintains
that the implementation of import substitution is due to the
dominance of a so-called state-class, which is a tri-party coa-
lition encompassing the government, local producers and multi-
national companies. This coalition accomplishes the extension of
import substitution to consumer durables, machinery and inter-
mediate products (secondary import substitution). This deepening
process is opposed by sizeable business groups representing a
large number of companies, which depend on imported intermediate
products and machinery. The production of these goods involves
both a high capital intensity as well as high absolute levels of
physical capital per plant. In developing countries only a small
exclusive group of companies is able to engage in this kind of
large scale production. Due to its endowment with capital this
small group is quite powerful compared to their customers, that
cover the majority of numerous small-scale producers. As a re-
sult, secondary import substitution is likely to be implemented.- 9 -
The import substitution industrialization (ISI) causes an in-
crease in average plant size and a concentration of firms in
large cities. As a result, labor faces lower costs of organi-
zation leading to a higher degree of unionization. Following the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, trade unions should be interested in
free trade, thereby raising the factor income of labor (Stolper-
Samuelson-lobbying). However, protection raises profits in the
respective industry, thus providing more opportunities for income
redistribution. Trade unions might take advantage of that by
raising wage demands in the collective bargaining process. For
this reason, trade unions which are organized with respect to
specific sectors might also have an interest in protection
(Carnesian lobbying). .
Thus, there are a number of groups on the political market:
various business groups, trade unions, bureaucracies, military
and landed groups. All these groups lobby for distributional
gains which are provided by politicians through protection. The
process of lobbying is not a zero-sum game, since protection does
not only involve redistribution of income but also allocative
inefficiency, which reduces the total welfare in the economy.
Protection accrues benefits to some groups, while it discrimi-
nates others. For this reason, there is a competition between
interest groups, which form coalitions and oppositions depending
on their interest. These activities have been referred to as
"rent-seeking" or "directly unproductive, profit-seeking acti-
vities" (DUP) in the literature. According to Krueger (1974a) and
Bhagwati (1982) individuals engage in such activities allocating
factors from production into lobbying. The welfare loss due to
this misallocation exceeds the allocative inefficiency caused by
the tariff.
However, there are limits to the rent-seeking activities. As long
as the benefits of rent-seeking fall on relative small groups,
there is an income redistribution from the public as whole to the
small group. Following Becker (19 83) small groups should perform
more successful lobbying, since the per capita loss of welfare in- 10 -
the society is lower. DUPs benefitting large groups lead to
larger per capita losses for each individual, who thereby is
given incentives for opposition.
Larger groups can easier lobby for protection when the latter
becomes a property right or a decisive part of an ideology, which
according to North (1979) may reduce the free-rider effect. A
distortion is viewed as a property right the longer it persists
and the more individuals take advantage of it. Thus, even larger
groups may also successfully engage in rent-seeking and realize
gains from ISI, though the costs to the society are substantially
higher. The rise in aggregate costs of protection creates in-
centives for trade liberalization. Following North (1979),
adjustments will occur only as long as private returns exceed
private costs. Since free trade is a public good, private returns
can be negligible especially for members of large groups. Hence,
large groups cannot alter the property rights because of the
free-rider problem. However, small groups or rulers, who do not
face a free-rider problem, can induce institutional changes.
Thus, a change in the trade regime is initiated by a small and
powerful group, since larger groups prefer the status-quo because
of their free-rider problem.
It has to be tested, whether the experience of a particular
country lends support to these theoretical hypotheses on the
political economy of import substitution and trade liberali-
zation. In this respect, the post-war development in Turkey is a
quite promising field for study since this country has expe-
rienced substantial changes in political systems as well as
fundamental shifts in trade policies during the last 30 years .
The Turkish economy has been traditionally based on agriculture
and processed agricultural products which also accounted for the
largest share in the country's total exports. Being an oil im-
porter it was subject to considerable adjustment problems caused
by the oil shocks. Thus, terms of trade deterioration and in-
dustrialization have led to considerable changes in the economic
structure ranging from excessive import substitution in the early
1960s to cautious export orientation during the 1980s.- 11 -
The second chapter of this paper provides a comprehensive over-
view of major political events and changes of trade regimes.
Moreover, the relevant interest groups are derived for each sub-
period in Turkish history. This rough analysis of interest groups
is deepened in the following three chapters, which have almost
the same structure.
In each chapter interest group pressure is related to decisive
changes in trade regimes, i.e. the implementation of ISI, as it
is assessed in Chapter 3, the implementation of secondary import
substitution, as it is in Chapter 4 and the trade liberalization
in Chapter 5. Each of these chapters start with an assessment of
the particular interest groups featuring the factions within the
group, its objectives, its incentives, and its relative power
vis-a-vis other groups. Thereafter, it is shown to what extent
these qualities were reflected in the actual outcome of the poli-
tical process. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes whether the economic
policies are in line with the theoretical hypotheses on import
substitution and subseauent trade liberalization.- 12 -
2. Interest Groups and their Role in the Recent History of
Turkey
This chapter gives a survey on Turkish history in order to derive
important pressure groups, which have been in a position to in-
fluence the government and its trade policies over several de-
cades. It is both convenient and conventional to divide the
Turkish history of economic policy into six periods: the period
1923-1932, during which laissez-faire policies were conducted;
the period 1933-1945 during which etatism and war economy domi-
nated; the years from 1946 to 1953 when gradual liberalization
was to be observed; the planless industrialization efforts from
1954 to 1959; the planned period of import substitution in the
1960s and 1970s; and finally the present liberalization measures,
that have been applied since 1979 . ,
2.1 The Compulsory Laissez-faire Policy
The founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 is not meant to be
the starting point of the analysis, as this period contrasts
sharply with the import substitution industrialization of the
planned period. Nevertheless, the founding years were formative,
since the economic system had inherited main features of the
Ottoman Empire namely the bureaucracy, state economic activities,
debt problems and the trade regime.
Despite profound institutional changes, the new leadership of the
Republic constituted of the reformist wing of the military -
bureaucratic elite of the Ottoman Empire. This elite was or-
ganized in the Republican People's Party (RPP), which was not to
be separated from the state as such, since the monoparty system
was guaranteed by the constitution. Gazi Mustafa Kemal, later
called Ataturk was both the military and political leader of this
movement during the war of liberation. He became the first presi-
dent of a republic, in which fundamental social and political
reforms were to be undertaken in order to defend the state from
religious-monarchist groups on the countryside as well as threatsdes Instituts fiir We!twirtscha$
- 13 -
from abroad. In this situation economic policy received little
attention by the government. This disinterest was also due to
restrictions of sovereignty provided by the Lausanne Peace Treaty
of 1923. According to this document, Turkey had to take over the
external debt of the Ottoman Empire and keep its non-protective
trade regime until 1929 granting the allied signatory nations
preferential treatment. In addition, alleviations for foreign
direct investment had to be introduced, so that foreign capital
was in a position to replace emigrating Greek businessmen and to
take over a part of the Ottoman state economic enterprises.
Hence, for the first ten years the government's role in economic
policy was restricted to restoring law and order. As a result,
the country experienced its most extended economic liberalism,
which was supported by the emerging muslim business class. More-
over, this policy helped to reassure credibility among non-muslim
minorities, that constituted the major part of private business.
However, there was no doubt that the powerful Istanbul business
groups, that had formerly cooperated with the occupants, pre-
ferred a more active role of the state. In an economic congress,
which was held by capital owners and traders in Izmir 1923, this
group demanded government assistance and protection vis-ei-vis
foreign companies in order to foster industrialization and agri-
cultural production .
Hence, there were four groups that influenced economic policy-
making from the very beginning:
- the military and the bureaucracy, which both formed the new
reformist elite organized in the RPP;
- the allied signatory nations, which represented the interests
of the foreign creditors and investors;
- the business class located in Istanbul and Izmir.
The RPP government had to settle its relations with the allied
signatory nations in order to carry through political reforms.
Hence, the RPP was willing to adhere to the laissez-faire policy,
even though this policy was not favored by local business groups.- 14 -
Given this liberal environment the economy faced extraordinary
growth rates averaging 13.3% from 1923-1929, which was due to
8
rising production and exports in the agricultural sector . Ini-
tially, this helped to reduce the trade deficit that had been
prevailing in the Ottoman Empire.
In the course of the 1920s the terms of trade turned increasingly
against Turkey. The deterioration of the balance of payments
became most dramatic in 1929, as individuals anticipated a
possible change in the trade regime provided by the expiration of
the Lausanne Treaty. Furthermore, the global impacts of the world
crisis led to a reduction of world trade, which the Turkish
economy depended on. The depression of 1929 hindered political
and social consolidation and radically altered the government's
perception of the country's political economy. Unleashed social
and cultural conflicts that were latently threatening Mustafa
Kemal's reform movement made the RPP more defensive and
agressive. The way out of depression was seen in autarky and
rapid industrial development through state intervention. The
results of the Soviet industrialization drive, especially against
the background of the Great Depression, looked very impressive
thus questioning private enterprises' ability to foster capital-
9
intensive industrialization . Immediately, such intentions were
challenged by liberal and anti-authoritarian urban groups that
had remained outside the coalition formed by the RPP. This oppo-
sition became organized in the Free Republican Party which was
founded in 1930 by an associate of Ataturk. It quickly seized
upon the economic uncertainty ushered in by the depression and
became quite popular . However, the manufacturing industry in
the private sector was yet underdeveloped, thus being a negli-
gible opposition against etatism. Business groups represented
primarily the interests of merchants. Hence, after the retreat of
the merchants, who opted for a position with the state, there re-
mained no faction of the bourgeoise favoring liberal market
ideologies. Thus, the RPP was in a position to realize its per-
ception of state-led industrialization.- 15 -
2.2 The Etatist Period of Import Substitution
Successively, the government shifted to etatism, starting with
restrictions on foreign trade. The tariff regulations of 1929
promulgated prohibitions of imports which were complemented by a
restrictive foreign exchange regime a year later. In addition, in
November 1931 a quota system was instituted that was to persist
50 years. Shielded by excessive protection, state economic enter-
prises were founded during the 1930s. As it was provided by the
First Five Year Industrial Plan the emphasis was placed on the
development of domestic textile, chemical, sugar, building
materials, coal, iron and steel, paper and cellulose, and other
industries mainly through government enterprises. Hence, the
first generation of industrialists comprised the bureaucrats and
technocrats, who were at the top of the state economic enter-
prises (SEEs) . As the SEEs were tightly bound to the central
bureaucracy, i.e. through the five year plans, their management
did constitute a pressure group, which was not to be separated
from the bureaucracy as such.
The establishment of infant industries in the state sector could
only temporarily offset the stagnation in agriculture. The annual
growth rate averaged 7.7% between 1930 and 1939, while the volume
of foreign trade initially declined due to the restrictions. With
the introduction of a clearing and compensation agreement in
1933, Turkish foreign trade became dominated by clearing-systems.
This regulation helped to increase the volume of trade , since
after the breakdown of the gold standard there was a lack of
internationally acknowledged balances for capital transfers.
The already high level of government intervention was further
increased with the beginning of the Second World War. Trade
became a state monopoly with the National Protection Law of 1940,
which instituted total government control of economic activity.
Although Turkey was not involved in the war, it remained
threatened and experienced a period of war economy. Agricultural
and industrial production declined considerably, since resources- 16 -
were diverted to mobilization measures. As these years were
characterized by shortages, inflation and overregulation, an
economy of corruption and semi-legal black-market operations
emerged. In addition to Istanbul merchants handling foreign
trade, a new class of speculators based mostly in provincial
towns arose.
In order to tax such profiteers an once-and-for-all capital tax
was levied, which in application, however, fell disproportionally
on non-Muslim business groups. Although this law benefitted many
aspiring muslim capitalists, it remained unpopular. This severe
injury of civil legality was to affect the reputation of the RPP
for decades, especially in business groups.
During the war, Turkey was able to repay its foreign debt and
accumulate a considerable stock of gold and foreign exchange
reserves, because the war fostered Turkey's exports in food
stuff, while import controls were restrictive. After the war,
tight regulations that constituted the war economy were
impediments for the recovery. The government was basically
willing to reduce the overregulation of the economy. However,
disputes on the degree of trade liberalization caused a fragmen-
tation of the RPP and finally led to the foundation of the Demo-
crat Party (DP) . This new party consisted of former prominent
members of the liberal wing of the RPP. Initially the RPP re-
12 garded the DP as a controlled loyal opposition . In fact, the
party programs and objectives of the two parties had much in
common, though the DP rejected the dominant role of the central
bureaucracy in etatism. The position of the DP was confirmed by
U.S. hegemony in Europe. Marshall Plan aid was practically con-
ditioned on the existence of multiparty democracy and private
entrepreneurship. Since the RPP regarded Turkey as a part of the
Western World, after Turkey had given up the wartime neutrality,
the government had to put up with the DP opposition. Given this
internal and external pressure the government cautiously
liberalized foreign trade and devalued the currency by more than
200% in 1945 . The GNP returned to its pre-war level due to
average growth rates of 12.2% during the 1945-50 period.- 17 -
Nevertheless, liberalization was proceeding very slowly due to
ideological differences within the RPP. The conflict became very
transparent, when the government envisaged a rapid land reform
that was intended to give incentives to small peasants thereby
14 increasing agricultural production and exports . As a result,
the latent coalition between the landed class, merchants and RPP
representatives dissolved. Consequently, the landed class and the
merchant groups made use of the new multiparty system and sided
with the DP. During the 1946 election the DP had been effectively
hindered by the local bureaucracy, which was occupied by RPP
sympathizers. In the 1950 elections, however, the DP was able to
win an absolute majority. The change of government marked the end
of the etatist period, in which a coalition of military and
bureaucrats had been dominating.
2.3 The Radical Export Orientation Experiments
The DP rejected all bureaucratic procedures and planning asso-
ciated with the monoparty era. The government under Prime
Minister Menderes removed almost all restrictions on imports and
created favorable conditions for foreign investment. Furthermore,
it was intended to denationalize state economic enterprises or at
least introduce profit-oriented pricing policies. The deregu-
lation of the economy was not due to purely economic reasons.
Both the central and the local bureaucracies were controlled by
the RPP. Hence, the DP had no choice but to exclude the bureau-
cracy from policy-making. Since the political support for the DP
originated largely from rural areas, the agricultural sector was
given priority with respect to investments in infrastructure. In
addition, price supports and tax exemptions were granted. The
preference given to the landed sector was in line with the
Marshall Plan consultations, according to which the Turkish
economy was to expand food production helping to remove the
shortages in post-war Europe . For this reason, the policy
change was not only favored by the landed groups and the
merchants but also by the USA, that became the major foreign
creditor.- 18 -
Under the DP government the outstanding export performance in the
agricultural sector continued and was further strengthened by the
Korean War. Annual GNP growth rates averaged 13% between 1950 and
1953. The export expansion coupled with an increase in income
facilitated an unprecedented import boom. The upswing of the
export economy came to a sudden end in 1954, when agricultural
exports declined due to a crop failure and decreasing demand.
Rising import demand and low levels of foreign investment caused
serious balance of payments problems, that were aggravated by the
overvaluation of the domestic currency. The government attempted
to cure the current account by imposing trade barriers restrict-
ing mainly imports of high-income consumer goods . This ad-hoc
return to protectionism had two effects. Firstly, the trade
barriers provided incentives for imported substitution in the
private sector, so that the merchant capital increasingly shifted
towards the production of consumer goods. Secondly, protection
was given through a quota system, which limited the foreign
exchange available for the importation of particular products.
This system proved to be rather discriminatory, since only a
small group of urban-based traders was in a position to take
advantage of this policy. It was primarily this group that
managed to obtain the cheap foreign exchange and the respective
import licences. In contrast, industrialists and exporters, who
did not have enough political influence, were discouraged by the
increasing interventionist policy of the DP.
Moreover, the state sector became an instrument of interven-
tionism, as the commercial groups did not come up to Menderes
1
expectations in purchasing state enterprises offered to them.
Such a sale did not transpire because there was political protest
against selling the profitable ones and no willing buyer for the
unprofitable companies. Nor did the private sector dramatically
increase investment as it lacked confidence to lead the way. Dis-
appointed by the response of the private sector, the DP once more
reverted the state sector as the more likely field of industrial
expansion. They started to put an emphasis on economic projects
that would also have a favorable political impact and guarantee- 19 -
votes in the next elections. Thus, the state sector became an
instrument of economic policy-making in the sense that the SEEs
were used for party politics and electoral campaigns. Indeed,
these so-called "election factories" together with pricing poli-
cies and generous subsidization of agriculture helped to maintain
the DP majority in parliament in the 1954 and 1957 elections
despite the growing inflationary impact of budget deficits
financed through central bank credits
By 1958, the balance of payments pressure combined with stag-
nation, inflation and an overvalued exchange rate led to a loan
agreement with the IMF and debt renegotiations with the OEEC
creditors. The 195 8 stabilization package included not only
standard measures like devaluation, tight credit ceilings and
other stabilization measures but also two important items, that
had lasting significance. The first was the establishment of a
trade regime based on detailed annual import programs fixing
import quotas by users and products. This import regime provided
one of the basic mechanisms for import substitution industrial-
ization, which had already emerged in an unplanned fashion as a
result of protectionism. The second was the establishment of a
central organ for planning, as it was proposed by the OEEC in
order to rationalize import substitution. The foundation of the
"State Planning Organization" (SPO) restored the power of the
central bureaucracy, which had lost importance during the DP era.
These institutional changes, nevertheless, were not to be ma-
terialized by the Menderes government, since the military assumed
power.
The military and the bureaucracy had been the losers of the DP
era. This loss in the social scale was mainly due to the increas-
ing inflation taxing constant wage earners. As a result the mili-
tary and the bureaucracy suffered real income losses causing
unrest within these two groups. The DP had good reason to feel
confident of its generals, especially the high command, which was
replaced after the 1950 elections. However, the government's
general disregard of the military's material welfare, especially
the well-being of the junior officers, proved to be a serious- 20 -
political error. In May 1960, the government declared the state
of martial law in order to settle student demonstrations. The
social unrest provided the perfect opportunity for the military
to intervene, as political controversies began to infect the
armed forces. The military coup did not bring about serious
opposition, since the economic impacts of the drastic stabili-
zation program and the 1958 devaluation on urban commercial and
industrial sectors caused a general disenchantment with the DP
government, which had not been able to satisfy increasing con-
flicting demands. In addition, the urban elite was concerned
about the DP•s appeal to traditional populism, which was supposed
to endanger modernization of the Western kind. The military coup
ended the DP era, which revealed a change in the political struc-
ture. Since the DP could not rely on the old bureaucratic-
authoritarian elite, the landed class and the merchants were the
more prominent interest groups in the 1950s. Another implication
of the DP policy was the emergence of import substituting in-
dustrialists in the private sector.
2.4 The Period of Planned Import Substitution
The planned efforts of ISI started with the institutional changes
brought about by the military rule. The officers who carried
through the coup of 1960 had a conception of social change
derived from the old authoritarian, etatist ideology. However,
soon after the coup the various currents within the ruling mili-
tary committee clashed on the question concerning the return to
democracy. A minority argued that economic development was the
foremost problem to be faced, which could best be tackled with
the aid of a planned, state-directed economy and a permanent in-
volvement of military in future politics. The*majority, which was
supported by the RPP leaders and the Istanbul bourgeoisie in-
tended to relinquish responsibility to an elected government.- 21 -
The first provisional government established under military rule
consisted mainly of civilians among them several trusted managers
and technocrats. First of all, the pay scale of the bureaucracy
and the military was adjusted to the new level of prices. There-
after, a Constitutional Assembly prepared a new constitution
leading to elections in October 1961. The RPP gained only a re-
lative majority, while the successors of the banned DP, the
Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party (NTP) achieved 233
out of 450 seats. This poll shows that the military coup did ndt
alter the preference of voters. Between 1961 and 1965 four
different coalitions were formed, the first three being led by
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the RPP and the last by the JP . Political stability was further
challenged, as the extreme minority in the military tried to
organize a new coup, which was prevented by the moderate majority
of military leaders. The signing of an association agreement with
the European Community in 1963 aiming at a full membership in the
long-run was the only remarkable political decision in this
period. The widespread political uncertainty temporarily halted
all investment, as businessmen hesitated.
This' caution was gradually given up, when the State Planning
Organization (SPO) launched the First Five Year Development Plan
(FFYDP) for the years 1963-1967, as it was provided in the con-
stitution. In addition, the Cyprus crisis in 196 4 stopped the
inter-party conflict creating an atmosphere of artificial na-
tional unity. The FFYDP proposed a strategy of import sub-
stitution industrialization (ISI) fostered by temporary import
19 restrictions . The investment boom of the 1960s started in the
SEEs which enlarged their capacity in the fields of investment
and intermediate goods. In early 1965 the JP returned to
government as the senior party of a four party coalition promis-
ing to fix boundaries for the state sector in order to allay the
anxieties of the private sector. These concerns were partly due
to a bill on land reform prepared by the RPP since 196 0 in order
to abolish large absentee land ownership and share cropping.
After the election campaign of 1965, in which the JP stressed its
belief in anti-communism and Islam associating the RPP with com-
munism, the JP government under Prime Minister Demirel was sup-- 22 -
ported by an overwhelming majority of 52.9%. The initial response
to this victory was one of relief that the country had left be-
hind the period of unstable coalitions.
Meanwhile the private sector took advantage of the ISI strategy.
In collaboration with foreign capital, investments were under-
taken in the production of durable consumer goods serving a re-
latively high-income market. In this respect, this policy was
substantially different from the nationalist-statist import-
substitution of the 1930s based on domestic inputs and oriented
to the production of basic consumer and intermediate goods for a
mass market in a semi-autarchic fashion. In contrast, the emerg-
ing assembly-industries, based mainly in urban areas, more
extremely depended on foreign exchange, since besides investment
goods most of the intermediate goods had to be imported inducing
a high demand for foreign exchange. As industrial production was
not based on domestic inputs, high agricultural prices were not
in conflict with the interests of industry. Since the foreign
exchange earnings of the economy were still based on the stagnant
traditional export structure, ISI led to a foreign exchange gap
that had to be compensated by increasing foreign debt. Moreover,
the private sector began to realize the opportunities provided by
a mixed economy on a broad scale, as entrepreneurs benefitted
from the subsidized inputs produced by the SEEs. In this pro-
tective environment even many small firms were able to flourish.
Most of these small companies served as subsidiaries for leading
import-substitution industries and as buyers of the SEEs
1 output.
Under Demirel's leadership the economic growth began to pick up
momentum and the economy grew at an average annual rate of 12%
from 1965 to 1969. However, this had been achieved at the cost of
constantly rising prices and wage levels that were kept low in
order to attract foreign investment. As a result, trade union
activities became militant engaging increasingly in political
strikes. In the early 1960s labor unions appeared as a powerful
interest group, after strike had been granted as a constitutional
right in the 1961 constitution. Hence, the labor unions were in a- 23 -
position to escape from corporatist control, as it had been pre-
vailing during the 1950s. Since unions became more independent
and stronger, they were woed by the parties, especially the RPP.
The 1969 elections polled a comfortable majority for the JP.
Nevertheless, Demirel's position was very weak. Retarding growth
rates in the manufacturing industry caused growing conflicts
within the business class undermining the power base of the JP.
Assisted by Ozal, the head of the SPO, Demirel attempted a
cautious step towards trade liberalization, that became known as
the 1970 reform package. In negotiations with the IMF and foreign
creditors, it was agreed upon a devaluation and structural
measures to encourage exports. In addition, a further association
agreement with the EEC envisaged tariff reductions and a partial
abolition of the quota system. However, the devaluation proved to
be the only measure that was politically to be implemented.
In February 1970, Demirel was forced to resign, when JP dissi-
dents voted against the budget. Although reappointed by President
Sunay, a former general, Demirel was not in a position to recover
from this set-back. In March 1971 military commanders assumed
power, after they had pronounced a ultimatum stating that they
would take over the government unless the parties were able to,
form a majority. They had intervened, but with the example of the
Greek military junta before, they preferred to control the
government indirectly by establishing a cabinet consisting of
policy planners, technocrats and managers under Professor Erim, a
neo-Democrat. This cabinet was supposed to represent all factions
in the RPP and JP. Nevertheless, it proved to be a government of
disunity, when a reform package including the land reform and
constitutional amendments with respect to personal freedom were
presented to the parliament. After the rejections of these pro-
posals, which came to the big surprise of industrialists and the
military, the government gave, priority to providing law and order
declaring martial law, challenged by the outbreak of urban
guerilla activity and strikes. In 1972 a new cabinet was
appointed,, in which the RPP was excluded.. This was an indication- 24 -
for the separation between the military and the RPP which became
a social democrat party under its new secretary general Ecevit.
As Turkey entered 1973, virtually no reform had been implemented
due to the opposition of the business groups and the landed class
in parliament.
The military commanders eventually had to draw back, as they
failed to have their candidate elected President. In the 1973
elections the "new" non-elitist but populistic RPP was supported
by the industrial work force and the urban poor. It turned out as
the winning party, though it was not given a sufficient majority
to form a strong government. In January 1974 it was agreed upon a
coalition with the National Salvation Party (NSP), which was
founded by Erbakan to translate the discontent of the small-town
traditional bourgeoisie, mainly landed groups and smaller busi-
ness formerly represented by the JP, into a platform of Islam
revivalism. Thus, the program of the new government reflected the
demands of its electorate: establishment of minimum prices for
agricultural produce, promotion of regionally balanced industria-
lization by the state sector, i.e. heavy industries; introduction
of unemployment and other social benefits. The program also
emphasized the committment to a national armaments industry,
which the high command had been calling for. Conservative busi-
ness circles were pleased to learn that economic development was
focused around the state sector, leaving the more profitable
light industry in private hands. This program marked the be-
ginning of secondary import substitution. The primary phase of
import substitution ended with a retardiation of growth in the
manufacturing sector, clashes of interests between regional
business groups, increased radical trade unionism and a stabili-
zation program, which did not involve trade liberalization but
rather an extension of ISI.
2.5 The Phase of Secondary Import Substitution
Hence, the inward orientation of the industry persisted, as it
was envisaged in the First Five Year Development Plan. The Second
Plan for 1968-1972 had clarified the concepts of ISI that had- 25 -
been implemented in 1960, as protection was proposed as a pre-
determined transitory measure . In practice, however, the re-
spective import quotas became increasingly restrictive as do-
mestic production grew, thereby indicating that the industry did
not believe in the temporary character of industry protection.
The Third Plan for 1973-1978 emphasized infant industry pro-
tection as a policy to foster outward oriented industrialization
leading to a diversified export structure rather than as a means
21 to achieve autarky . In fact, the 1970 devaluation led to a
doubling of exports, i.e. in the food and the textile sector and
to a steady increase of work remittances from Europe, as it is to
be seen from Table 2.1. Nevertheless, the rapid increase of
foreign exchange receipts between 1970-1973 was not the corner-
stone of a reorientation but rather enabled ISI to persist poli-
tically as well as economically, i.e. during the first oil shock.
The political stability due to the RPP/NSP coalition was only
short-lived, as Ecevit resigned in September 1974. The RPP tried
to go for an early poll in order to use its popularity after the
occupation of Cyprus. However, this attempt was frustrated by an
assembly controlled by parties which did not want early elec-
tions. After more than 6 months of ministerial crisis Demirel
succeeded in the formation of the so-called Nationalist Front
Government encompassing the JP, the NSP and the Nationalist
Movement Party (NMP), a party devoted to traditional fashist
ideas. This coalition had taken those reforms out of the RPP
program that could help to enhance its standing with the
electorate: extensions of unemployment benefits, reduction in the
price of artificial fertilizers thereby subsidizing landlords.
Nevertheless, RPP turned out as the winner of the 1977 elections,
though no party succeeded in gaining the majority of seats. The
RPP, which was given support by Istanbul industrialists and trade
unions, failed to organize a coalition government. Demirel, who
returned as the head of a second National Front coalition was
also forced to resign after a no-confidence vote. Following
Demirel's failure, Ecevit formed a minority government backed by
recently defected independents from the JP. Virtually, economic- 26 -




















































































































































Source: William Hale (1981) , OECD (1983).- 27 -
policy-making was reduced to restricting imports and taking up
foreign loans in order to cover the foreign exchange gap. The
embarassment of economic decision-makers and their lack of con-
ception were reflected in the Fourth Five Year Development Plan
22
for 1979-1983 , which was delayed one year due to lacking majo-
rities. The political crisis which accompanied the economic
exhaustion of ISI was not only reflected in a splintering of the
party system; widespread civil and political unrest throughout
1978 prompted a declaration of martial law.
The security situation worsened even further during 1979. Ecevit
was again obliged to step down, as he faced a number of mini-
sterial defections. Thus, Demirel returned as head of an all-
justice government in November 1979. Despite extensive resche-
duling and continuous devaluations since 1974, there was no
economic recovery registered. In contrast, real production
declined in 1979 and 1980, while inflation rates exceeded 100%.
The stagnation of domestic demand as well as the shortage of
imported inputs resulting from the foreign exchange gap caused
considerable overcapacities and unemployment in the manufacturing
sector. Terrorism and the polarization of industrial relations
was followed by excessive strikes and lock-outs. The budget defi-
cits increased sharply due to the subsidization of landed groups
and industrialists and the rise of social benefits, while the tax
base was eroded. The hopeless balance of payments situation,
which deteriorated drastically after the second oil shock, forced
the government to engage in negotiations with the IMF and the
World Bank. This fact and the nearly desperate conditions of the
economy forced Demirel and Ozal, the director of the SPO, to once
again institute long-term policies that came to be known as the
January 24, 1980 stabilization measures. This package included a
devaluation associated with changes in respective legislation
allowing for successive mini-devaluations, price increases for
the output of state-economic enterprises, abolishment of the
Price Control Board leading to considerable price increases for
almost all goods, lifting of bureaucractic impediments to exports
as well as subsidization of export industries, restrictive mone-- 28 -
tary and fiscal policies and the abolishment of interest rate
23 controls .The latter, however, was immediately followed by , a
gentlemen's agreement between the oligopolistic bankers.
After having partly met the conditionalities for structural
adjustment loans and stand-by-agreements provided by the World
Bank and the IMF, debt renegotiations and new OECD loan agree-
24 ments were facilitated . Nevertheless, the Demirel government
suffered from a lack of credibility, political impotence and
further deterioration of internal security. Thus, the stabili-
zation package did not reveal immediate effects.
The parliament and the bureaucracy were paralyzed, since partisan
politics had invaded every aspect of the state. As the parliament
failed to elect a new president and pass drastic security
measures, the military that had so far been a silent vigilant
publicly criticized the- assembly. This was supposed to be a
threat, as it was always voiced to indicate the discontent of the
military and the possibility of military intervention. On
September 12, 1980 General Evren, chief of the high command, led
a military coup on behalf of a five-men National Security Council
(NSC) that suspended the constitution and dissolved the assembly.
All existing parties were banned and many of their leaders, in-
cluding Demirel and Ecevit, imprisoned. Strikes as well as lock-
outs were forbidden, while collective bargaining was replaced by
government decrees. Thousands of people, among them leading trade
unionists were arrested on political charges. Martial law was
extended to all 67 provinces and security forces succeeded in
immediately restoring internal stability. Meanwhile, the NSC had
confirmed it would follow an economic policy on the grounds of
the 24 January package. In order to demonstrate continuity Ozal,
the architect of the 1970 as well as 1980 reforms, was appointed
Deputy Prime Minister. The leading businessmen welcomed the
take-over on the grounds that the stabilization package was
25 likely to be implemented .; In fact, the military coup ended a
political crisis, which was an impediment for economic recovery.- 29 -
2.6 The Steps towards Export Orientation
Nevertheless, the January 24, 19 80 stabilization measures were
only the first step of what Ozal hoped would be a major trans-
formation of the economy from its inward looking nature to an
outward looking one. Since the difficulties in passing the legis-
lative aspects of the reforms were removed, Ozal's proposals
signalled the abandonment of ISI. In December 1980 an extensive
tax reform was implemented recovering the tax base of the
country. In the same year, prices of almost all commodities pro-
duced by SEEs- were increased. Foreign currency holdings by resi-
dents were permitted. In March 1981, the import regime was li-
beralized allowing for unrestricted importation of intermediate
goods. The quota system was legally abolished. In May, controlled
floating was introduced instead of permanent devaluations. Export
subsidies and deregulation in the trade regime were successfully
implemented. In August legislation with respect to capital mar-
kets was passed, which legally facilitated the reopening of the
Istanbul stock exchange and allows for private trade in bonds. As
the restrictive monetary policy further reduced internal demand
many companies producing consumer durables had to decrease their
stocks through exports. Only the bigger conglomerates could
sustain losses through export trade. Nevertheless, exports in
manufactured goods increased sharply, which was, however, mainly
2 6 due to the construction sector and textile producers
During the banking crisis in summer 1982, which was initiated by
the breakdown of one of the major newly founded independent
banks, the government was to relax the restrictive monetary
policy in order to be able to guarantee the deposits. In
addition, the central bank created a "rescue fund" in order to
back some large-scale holding companies which were endangered by
bankruptcy. Ozal, who had criticized this policy approach,
resigned and began to organize his Motherland Party (MP) . At a
national referendum of November 1982, Turkish voters overwhelm-
ingly approved a new constitution, under which General Evren was
formally designated as president. The military leaders, who had- 30 -
always envisaged a transition to democracy, wanted to rule out
any immediate likelihood of anything resembling the earlier party
system. Thus, the old parties remained banned, while their lead-
ing politicians were not allowed to engage politically for ten
years. Only three of 18 parties that had been nearly founded were
approved for registration in the November 1983 elections.
Although the military frankly supported the Nationalist Democracy
Party (NDP) it was outpolled by Ozal's Motherland Party, which
gained a comfortable majority of seats.
Given this support Ozal gave up to liberalize imports as cau-
tiously as it was done in the past but abolished the old import
27 regime based on "positive" lists . This was a part of the new
19 84 trade regime, which harmonized tariffs with the schedules
envisaged in the association treaties with the EEC. In addition,
most tariffs and all quotas were replaced by so-called funds,
which had to be paid to the housing fund or other foundations, so
that they did not appear in the budget. In fact, these funds are
tariffs, even though they have to be paid in foreign currency.
Furthermore, some institutional reforms have been undertaken. The
number of ministeries was reduced, while at the same time the
performance of all bureaucratic institutions was rationalized.
The SEEs had to introduce profit-maximizing principles, even
though the price increases have been regarded as one of the main
sources of inflation. Some public municipalities were privatized
by distributing participation shares to the public. However, the
1984 policies of the Ozal administration had also to take into
account the initial effects of liberalization. The inflation rate
has been too high due to high deficits of the municipalities; the
unemployment rate went up as a consequence of the breakdown of
the domestic market; real wages have been constantly decreasing;
business faced liquidity problems due to restrictive monetary
28 policies;, and the level of investments was too low . The new
government's economic policy continues to give priorities to
exports, especially to the Middle East and North Africa., Since
then, the public sector has refrained from investments in heavy- 31 -
industries, with the exception of arms industries, while the
private sector considers such investments unprofitable. In order
to reestablish the domestic markets, the tax reform facilitates
the deduction of personal consumption from the income tax within
certain limits. At the same time, the tax system was rationa-
lized, so that it became easier to impose controls. The aggre-
gated tax base has increased, since agriculture and small busi-
ness are subject to income and property taxation.
The Fifth Five Year Development Plan for 1985-1989 confirms the
export-oriented growth strategy by proposing further liberali-
zation of imports "to the advantage of export industry and the
consumer", "free-trade zones in order to encourage foreign direct
investment" and the "promotion of labor-intensive industries to
29 increase employment"
However, there is still a gap between these ambitious objectives
and political reality. In fact, liberalization measures have been
discriminatory, since the present protection allows for import
substitution in the fields of consumer durables and arms in-
dustries. Thus, the present system is far from being neutral,
though it reflects a prominence of export-orientation over import
substitution industrialization.
2,7 Summing up; Important Interest Groups 1923-83
The political economic history of Turkey, as it was sketched in
this chapter, reveals a number of interest groups that are likely
to have affected the process of economic policy-making: military,
bureaucracy, foreign creditors, business groups, landed groups
and labor unions.
The military has been a powerful group from the very beginning of
the Turkish Republic. Together with the bureaucracy it formed the
authoritarian state elite. Since the establishment of the multi-
party system in 1950, the military commanders have directly
assumed power in 1960, 1971 arid 1980. In all three instances, the- 32 -
take-overs marked the beginning and the end of a chapter in
Turkish economic history. In contrast to Latin American military
dictatorships, the military in Turkey always returned the power
to a civilian government, which they used to influence by voicing
threats. - .
Beside the military, the bureaucracy is the second state insti-
tution, which has acted as an independent pressure group.•Bureau-
crats have been engaged in the management of the SEEs, in local
administrations as. well as in central planning. Hence, the
bureaucratic institutions are less homogeneous as a pressure
group. . •.•'•"•..•
The foreign creditors, i.e. international institutions like the
IMF, World Bank, OEEC and OECD, had an active part in the formu-
lation of the stabilization programs in 1958, 1970 and 1980.
Since Turkey has been depending on foreign loans since the end of
the Second World War, the conditionalities of these loans have
been a determinant of economic policy-making.
The business group can be attributed a less obvious role in poli-
tic.s because of two arguments. Firstly, business did not form a
homogeneous group, as it was reflected by the division into com-
mercial and industrial interests on the one hand, and regional
factions on the other. Secondly, business groups made use of
party politics in order to achieve political gains.
This characteristic does also apply to the landed interests,
which gained considerable importance during the DP era in the
1950s. Since the Second World War this group has been successful
in defending the privileges of the landlords and avoiding the
implementation of land reforms.
The trade unions entered the political process towards the end of
the third phase of ISI in the late 1960s. Their field of activi-
ties shifted more < and more from collective bargaining to re-
presentation of political demands. Since the labor unions became- 33 -
mass organizations they were in a position to affect party poli-
cies.
These are the interest groups, which according to the theory in
Chapter 1 form the basis for explaining the changes in economic
policy. The following three chapters analyze to what extent the
activities of these interest groups have led to the three im-
portant shifts in the development strategy in the last 30 years:
1. the shift from export orientation towards ISI in the 1960s;
2. the deepening of ISI towards secondary import substitution in
the 1970s;
3. the exhaustion of ISI and the shift towards export orientation
in the 1980s.- 3 4. -
3. Vested- Interests in the Implementation of ISI
This chapter assesses the role of interest groups in the imple-
mentation of ISI. The first section takes a closer look at the
interest groups, which have been derived in the previous chapter.
For each group an assessment of its origin, foundation, organi-
zation, its sources of power and its interest in ISI is given
taking account of the various factions which may,prevail in the
groups. Furthermore, the particular groups
1 linkages with the
political parties and the government are analyzed.
The second section shows to what extent these vested interests
engaged in coalitions for or against ISI. According to the public
choice theory the relative power of particular groups and coali-
tions determine government policy. This hypothesized policy
resulting from the direction of interest group pressure is com-
pared with the actual policy outcome.
3.1 Pressure Groups
3.1.1 The Military
In general, the military in developing countries has a compara-
tive advantage with respect to violence, as together with other
security forces they are given a monopoly on power in most con-
stitutions. Thus, the military is the only group which can de-
liberately liquidate other interest groups. When this monopoly is
questioned by guerilla warfare and social riot, military leaders
can be expected to take a more active role in politics to defend
their position.
Furthermore, the military as a group is also interested in the
economic well-being of its soldiers. For this reason the military
in developing countries is likely to take also an active role in
economic life . The military in Turkey did directly assume power
in 1960, 1971 and 1980 in order to direct the political process.
During the democratic periods in between, the military voiced
threats, which were an indirect means of influencing policies.- 35 -
The military had been assigned the role of a vigilant for inte-
rior security within a strong coalition covering also the RPP and
the central bureaucracy. As this coalition lost its power, the
military found it extremely difficult to adjust to the liberal
capitalist environment as provided by the DP government in the
1950s. The populist rule of the DP caused a serious loss of poli-
tical power for the military in general. During the DP era sol-
diers' participation in the cabinets and in parliament declined
drastically . Furthermore, the RPP, which was the representative
of the bureaucratic-military elite, was increasingly suppressed
by the DP majority in parliament. In addition, there was a dis-
content of the Turkish military with the economic policies of the
DP government. The military were among the group which suffered
most directly and visibly from the inflation, which was not
32
matched by increase in salary . Another source of dissatisfac-
tion was rooted in the social composition of the Turkish army,
which has been recruited largely from the lower-middle class thus
being extremely sensitive to policies favoring minorities at the
expense of wage-earners . In addition, the personal income tax
fell unequally on constant wage earners, while landed groups and
34 tradesmen were practically exempted . The government did not,
however, neglect the military on the whole. The DP woed the high
command by offering attractive positions for retired officers in
the party, the local administration or even in the SEEs. However,
this policy failed to serve the interest of the majority of offi-
cers, especially the younger ones, who were increasingly hit by
inflation and a loss of prestige.
This treatment led to cleavages in the military which became
divided into two parties: the "moderates", as they were repre-
sented by the high command and staff officers and the "radicals",
encompassing the younger junior officers . Having arrived at the
top of their profession most senior officers belonged to the
moderates. They were affected by the conservatism that came with
rank, age, status and the attainment of a comfortable material
position . In contrast, the "radical" junior officers were high-
ly nationalistic, progressive, authoritarian and developmental-
minded.- 36 -
However, the respect for institutional hierarchy was never
explicitly challenged. Even the "radicals" sticked to their in-
stitutional ethic, which makes the military an effective pressure
group. Thus, planning the coup of 1960 the radicals preferred to
coalesce around some moderate members of the high command, who
were concerned about the unity of the army. The majority of the
high command had continued to support the RPP. As a result the
army as a homogeneous body assumed power in May 1960. The coup
was intended to realize the following objectives:
1. removal of the DP rule and its supporters;
2. guaranteeing the participation of the army in the future poli-
tical process;
3. guaranteeing the economic well-being of the military as a
corporate body.
However, the two factions in the military had quite different
conceptions how to achieve these objectives. The radicals argued
that economic development was the foremost problem, which was to
be solved with the aid of a planned, state-directed economy and a
long-term direct military rule. The moderate wing wanted to re-
turn the power to a civilian government as soon as possible. This
disinclination to rule directly is mainly due to the military's
lacking capacity to manage a complex society . The risk-aware-
ness of the high command remained always geared to keeping the
military's traditional reputation in the public. Hence, the re-
form of the institutional setting was due to the outcome of the
dispute between the two factions.
The National Unity Council (NUC), which was the military govern-
ment, encompassed both factions, of which the radicals had the
majority. This disadvantage was offset by the fact that the
moderate Gen. Giirsel was the head of the NUC. In addition, the
moderate faction, which was initially against the coup, con-
trolled almost all key units in Ankara and Istanbul, especially
38
the top military command and the air force . Although the radi-
cals succeeded in a rejuvenation of the military in 1960, most of
them were purged from the NUC in 1961.- 37 -
Eventually, the political objectives of the military reflected
the moderate faction's interest. The military aimed at gradually
returning the power to a civilian regime, even though it was
expected to reduce the dominance of the military in policy-mak-
39 ing . The military as a whole has maintained this position,
though it was challenged by extremist officers attempting to
carry through coups in 1962 and 1963.
Hence, the military government's conceptions intended to realize
its objectives in the following way:
1. The DP was banned, while its main supporters, namely the land-
lords were partly expropriated or became subject to higher
taxation
2. The military tried to guarantee its future role in politics
through three channels. Firstly, the head of the NUC, Gen.
Gtirsel, was elected president. Secondly, a so-called National
Security Council (NSC) encompassing high-rank officers was
constituted as a supervisory board. Thirdly, the two larger
parties, namely the RPP and the JP, were led by ex-generals.
The military considered these channels enough to serve their
adequate participation in politics.
3. Finally, the military also tried to secure its economic po-
sition. Entering the first phase of import substitution the
military became actually a part of it, when the Army Mutual
41 Assistance Association (OYAK) was founded in 1961 . This
organization was initially planned as a pension fund providing
housing credits, recreation facilities and pensions for offi-
cers. Regular officers are obliged to pay ten percent of their
income into this institution which has invested its massive
funds in numerous large-scale enterprises featuring production
of machinery and transport equipment, chemicals and tourism.
Since most of these enterprises were founded in the early
1963s, the military was indirectly involved in the promotion
of ISI.- 38 -
3.1.2 The Bureaucracy
The bureaucracy in Turkey can be divided into the central bureau-
cracy, the local administration and the managers of the SEEs. As
it will be shown later, there were basic rivalries between these
institutions on the issues of competence, hierarchy and wages.
However, due to the professional mobility between the different
institutions and because of the administrative interlinks, the
bureaucrats can be treated as a corporate group with vested
interests. The effectiveness of the bureaucracy as an interest
group is due to the prevailing internal hierarchy and the legi-
42 timation through institutions and common law
Just like in the armed forces, the bureaucracy allows for a high
degree of social mobility thus providing attractive career oppor-
tunities. In the monoparty period the civil bureaucracy was over-
whelmingly dominant, as it was the chief source of reforms to-
gether with the RPP and the military. However, this political
standing declined with the end of Etatism. In the DP era, the
public sector salaries underwent a serious radical decline re-
sulting from rapid inflation as well as the general disfavor with
43 which the DP treated civil servants
The military coup of 1960 restored the old coalition between the
RPP, the military and the bureaucracy. Thus, the civil bureau-
cracy was to be reinstitutionalized though not to be elevated to
the same level as the military in running the affairs of the
state. The RPP argued that the economic problems could only be
with the help of economic planning. The NUC had to rely on
determined administration consisting of bureaucrats. Both, the
RPP and the NUC fostered a constitution, in which they fixed the
dominant role of the central bureaucracy in planning. The result
was the foundation of the SPO, which legally was given a high
44 degree of autonomy . The SPO had been given a broad competence,
which covered
the determination of investment in infrastructure and the
SEEs;- 39 -
decisions on incentives that were to be given to the private
sector;
proposals on macro-politics, foreign direct investment and
price policies.
Given this competence, the central bureaucracy was in a position
to influence decisions on allocation, income distribution and
rent-seeking in general.
A study by Roos and Roos (1971) shows that the newer admini-
strative departments in Turkey enjoy the highest status due to
salary level, political factors, the chance to increase know-
45 ledge, authority, promotion, prestige and the location . This
led to cleavages between the new institutions (such as the SPO)
on the one hand, and the Ministry of Finance, the SEEs and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the other . However, this inter-
nal rivalry did not affect the bureaucrats siding with ISI. This
47 can be obtained from the First Five Year Development Plan ,
which reflected mainly the attitudes of the central bureaucracy
and SEE management, since politicians were hindered by the mili-
tary. At the outset of the First Five Year Development Plan, the
SPO stated that "goods of which internal production partly covers
internal needs will not be included in the liberalization lists
and if already included will be taken out... Import programs will
give priority to imports which contribute to the realization of
48
plan targets" . The bureaucracy's fostering of ISI was asso-
ciated with demands for increased regulation in general and in
. . T 49 particular :
allocation of more financial capital for SEEs;
increase of salaries for the bureaucrats;
guaranteeing of the political autonomy of the central bureau-
cracy in planning and decision-making.
These political demands go in harmony with Niskanen's theory on
the bureaucracy as it has been sketched in the first chapter.- 40 -
3.1.3 The Landed Interests
During the monoparty era the RPP and the central bureaucracy used
to treat landowners and peasants in their elitist fashion neg-
lecting them as a factor in economic policy-making. The intro-
duction of the mulitparty system immediately changed the politi-
cal influence of the landed class. It quickly realized its
opportunities given by its voting power, since the majority of
population was located in rural areas.
However, elections did not merely reflect the preferences of the
entire rural population. Taking into account the prevailing
patron-client relationships in rural societies, elections were a
mechanism for special interest politics, since the majority of
clients always had to follow in the wake of their patrons. The
traditional patronage was given by landlords, who legally or
illegally owned the major part of the land in a village, if not
the entire village. The clients constituted of smaller land
tenants, who were given social protection by their patron. The
patronage altered with the beginning of export orientation in
agriculture and then even more with import substitution. Agri-
cultural mechanization was restricted to large land zones. Thus,
smaller tenants became share-croppers or land workers, if they
did not migrate to the cities leaving their parcells to their
relatives or selling it to the landlords . Increased indu-
strialization did not only increase the migration to the cities,
but created linkages between industry and agriculture. On the one
hand, the agricultural sector served as a market for the pro-
tected consumer durables and agricultural inputs industries. On
the other hand, the agricultural sector provided intermediate
goods for food, tobacco, textile and clothing industries, which
were equally protected. The modernization of agriculture and the
industrialization in related industries changed the economic
activities of patrons. The new patrons, who are partly identical
with the old ones, were traders, local merchants, absentee land-
lords, that had moved to the cities, and owners of related in-
dustries. In the eastern parts of Turkey, both forms of patronage
have been existing simultaneously.- 41 -
The ability of the patrons to guarantee the votes of their
clients gave the patrons a favorable bargaining position against
the political parties. In the rural sector, parties have been
playing a much less significant role, since it is not the party
ideology which counts but rather the personal influences. Thus,
party loyalties have been weaker and voting behavior is charac-
terized by sudden erratic changes from one election to the
next . In many cases the patron was a member of a party or even
a politician. The patrons used the parties as a forum to achieve
local gains. In some cases party membership was only due to local
rivalries between two landlords. One patron's adherence to one
party encouraged his rival's adherence to its principal opponent
52 party . The defection of patrons from one party to another could
cause major shifts in voting behavior contributing to political
instability.
As a result, landowners were a major determinant in politics. The
vested interests of this group of large market-oriented land-
owners was very clearly defined:
-* prevention of any kind of land reform, as they were proposed by
the RPP in the 1940s and as it was temporarily implemented by
the NUC in 1960;
- provision of subsidized modern agricultural inputs, as they
were produced by the SEEs;
- determination of high support prices, which involves the set-
ting of the prices by the cabinet and the purchasing of the
same commodities by state agencies, mainly SEEs.
- provision of preferential credits by the Agricultural Bank
(Ziraat Bankasi).
The question of land reform had already been a crucial question
in the 1950 elections. After the military coup of 1960 the NUC
managed to expropriate some landlords and to implement an ex-
tensive land reform. Since the parties had been paralyzed by the
military coup, the landed interests had little means of oppo-- 42 -
sition. After power had been returned to an elected government,
the landed class succeeded in redressing the situation. Thus,
unlike small exclusive pressure groups, the landed group has
depended on its voting power to carry through its interest. In
general, the _ landed groups were not in a position to carry
through their interests under the non-democratic military
regimes.
Furthermore, the landed class was interested in continuous sub-
sidization, especially in the price-support policy that dated
back to the 1930s. Prices were determined by the board of
ministers, which implemented protectionist measures or instructed
the various SEEs to engage in respective purchases . Due to
these measures, the prices for some agricultural products started
54 • to exceed the world market prices in the 1950s . In addition,
subsidies were granted through preferential credits and subsi-
dized inputs produced by the SEEs. The losses of the SEEs were
financed by Central Bank credits, adding to the inflation until
the system was partly abolished as a result of trade liberali-
zation. An empirical study by Ergiider (19 80) shows that the
support-policy was clearly a function of electorates', pressure
and party policies.
Given these institutional regulations it is hardly surprising
that the landed sector did not oppose the implementation of
planned ISI, in particular as an important goal of this policy
was to attain food self-sufficiency . Thus, there was an in-
ward-orientation of the agricultural sector, even though the
agricultural sector was meant to obtain the foreign exchange
required for ISI. These two aims were not contradictory under the
prevailing institutional arrangement. Although the landed sector
was the prominent exporter, it had no incentive to lobby against
protectionism and ISI. Usually, exporters are taxed by high-
priced inputs, overvalued exchange rates and a price increase of
the scarce factor. However, in Turkey input and capital - access
were subsidized, while the state agencies had taken over the
exporting of agricultural products. Furthermore, the industrial- 43 -
and the rural sector did not compete for non-skilled labor, since
this was the abundant factor. Thus, the landed groups had no
reason to feel taxed by ISI, but rather adapted a position of
neutrality or cautious approval.
3.1.4 Foreign Creditors
The inward orientation of domestic industry after 1958 led to a
high dependency on foreign exchange receipts. On the one hand,
import substitution industries were unable to export, while on
the other these industries permanently depended on imported in-
puts and capital goods. The traditional exporters, i.e. agri-
cultural exporters, and the worker remittances from abroad were
not sufficient to meet the increasing demand of foreign exchange
given the permanent overvaluation of the (fixed) exchange rate.
In addition, these two sources were subject to heavy fluctuation
because of unstable foreign demand for agricultural products as
well as the recession in Western Europe resulting in unemployment
and a decline of workers' remittances. Hence, the only solution
to the foreign exchange gap was a permanently rising stock of
foreign debt.
Since Turkey's role as a foreign trade partner or as a host
country for FDI was not that relevant, the western industrialized
countries had a predominantly political interest in Turkey's
political stability as an important NATO member country. Thus,
the official creditors have been providing the largest part of
the loans, especially on a bilateral basis. The interest struc-
ture of the official lenders were subject to a dilemma. On the
one hand, foreign creditors proposed a strategy of outward orien-
tation, since this policy was expected to be the best way to
guarantee a stable political and economic development in Turkey.
On the other hand, dictating their policy conditionalities the
foreign creditors had to be careful and take into account the
good relation with Turkey as an important partner country in
NATO. Hence, contrary to the foreign creditors' intention, the
permanent supply of credits enabled ISI to survive for more than
a decade, as new foreign loans had to cover the foreign exchange
gap.- 44 -
During the beginning of the 1960s the stock of foreign debt did
not exceed 0.7 billion $ . Hence, the government was not yet
highly dependent on foreign credits, while the foreign creditors
did not insist on strict measures of trade liberalization, when
they were asked for assisting the 1958 stabilization program. In
On the contrary, the OEEC and later the OECD, which coordinated
the demands of the bilateral creditors, proposed tight control of
imports through trade barriers . According to these organi-
zations, raising the level of investment was the foremost problem
of the country, which could be also achieved by primary import
r o
substitution . Hence, foreign creditors did not oppose the be-
ginning of planned import substitution in Turkey, even though
they favored a more outward-oriented policy.
3.1.5 Trade Unions
Apart from the landed groups, labor was an economic factor which
suddenly gained importance, when free elections had been allowed.
Because of the influence that trade unions can exert on their
members, both the DP and the RPP fostered the development of
trade unions. As a result, the Confederation of Turkish Trade
Unions (TURK-I§) was founded in 1952. Immediately, the member
unions voiced their perference of import substitution as they
promoted the use of domestic products in order to fight un-
59 employment . Due to the decline in standards of living during
the war economy, the DP was favored in the elections of the
1950s. However, in the export-oriented environment of the fifties
TURK-IS remained unimportant. Firstly, because the DP refrained
from granting labor the right to strike, as it had been promised
before the 1950 elections. Secondly, the DP preferred to address
labor, i.e. urban workers, directly by social policy measures
thereby circumventing TURK-I$
Despite the high rates of unionization, as can be obtained from
Table 3.1, the broad dispersion of small regional unions hindered
effective lobbying. In addition, the DP exerted corporatist
control on TURK-I§ by using financial endowments or simply clos-- 45 -



























































Note: In the 1970s the percentage rate of unionization exceeds 100 percent, which is
not due to statistical errors, but results from workers' membership in more than
one union at the same time.
Source: I?ik (1987), p. 316.- 46 -
ing down unfavorable local unions and federations. In addition,
the leaders of Tt)RK-I§ used to sympathize with the DP, as in this
case concessions were more likely to be obtained. As a result,
Tt)RK-I§ remained under the control of conservative union re-
presentatives until the 1970s, when a social democratic oppo-
sition managed to establish itself in the General Assembly of
TURK-I?.
After the 1960 coup the trade unions were given the constitu-
tional right to strike. However, they could not make use of this
right under the military rule. Hence, the trade unions did not
constitute a powerful interest group, when planned import sub-
stitution was implemented.
3.1.6 Business Groups
Between 1950 and 1970, the main spokesman of private business in
Turkey was the Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Commo-
dity Exchanges of Turkey (UCT). This organization has the legal
status of a "public corporate body" (muessesati umumiye) owing
to respective legislation from the 1920s. Although these laws
brought the existing 50 chambers, dating back from the Ottoman
Period, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce, it is
interesting to note that its statutory terms do not define the
functions of the chambers. Thus, the only aim in lending an offi-
cial status to the chambers was to make membership and respective
dues obligatory and hence bring together small and fragmented
local capital under corporatist control of the administration.
The Union of Chambers is a highly centralized organization, whose
budget is 50 percent financed by subscription dues. The rest is
derived from fees charged for quasi-governmental services and
administrative functions delegated by the government. Clashes of
interest within the Union of Chambers have been due to its
organizational structure which rests on two principles. Firstly,
the formation of the local chambers conforms to the local admini-
stration structure of Turkey encompassing 67 provinces and 571
districts (ilce). As each local chamber or commodity exchange is
legally entitled to one representative in the General Assembly of- 47 -
the UCT regardless of membership strength or amounts of revenue,
regional disparities led to factionalism within the UCT.
Secondly, a local chamber can be split up into a Chamber of Com-
merce and a Chamber of Industry, if there is a written request of
industrialists in a province provided that they constitute at
least 30 members. In legal terms, an "industrialist" encompasses
all enterprises that employ 10 workers or use power-driven
machinery and employ 5 workers. In practice, however, it was not
easy to leave a local Chamber of Commerce and Industry in order
to found a separate Chamber of Industry. Such a leave would have
caused a loss in membership dues. The majority of commercial
interests, that dominated the local Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, always opted against a separation, since the division
into separate Chambers of Commerce and Chambers of Industry could
cause a considerable loss in financial and thereby in political
power. Hence, only large industrial enterprises were in the
position to counteract opposing commercial interests trying to
prevent the industrialists to establish their own local chamber.
In most cases industrialists had to put up with the dominance of
commercial groups within local Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
As a result, the General Assembly of the UCT reflected an over-
whelming majority of commercial interests, as it can be seen from
Table 3.2. Despite their numerical weakness, the eight Chambers
of Industry as well as the two bigger Chambers of Commerce, name-
ly Izmir and Istanbul, exerted considerable power in union poli-
tics owing to their economic power, which enables them to make
use of inofficial links with the government, the mass media and
within the UCT
61.
The struggle between commercial interests and industrialists and
its actual outcome has always been essential for the determina-
tion of the import regime. As a result of the overregulation and
the black-market operations during the Second World War, the- 48 -






































Source: Eski^ehir Sanayi Odasi (1973), Oncii (1980), own calculations.- 49 -
private sector had gained considerable economic power, especially
6 2 the commercial sector . The RPP government took certain steps
concerning concepts of trade liberalization consulting with UCT
representatives of the Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir chambers in
1948. The tension between the government and these business
groups was aggravated because of the 1947 devaluation of the
Turkish currency. The industrialists' rejection of the etatist
policy partly constituted itself in the National Development
Party (NDP) founded by an Istanbul industrialist named Demirag.
Commercial interests, however, favored the DP, that gained power
in 1950.
The clash of interests between the dominant commercial groups and
industrialists was revealed on an extraordinary meeting of
the UCT General Assembly 1951 during which the import-export
merchants advocated a liberalization of the import regime and a
predominant place for agriculture relative to industry . This
strategy of economic development completely matched the views of
the DP thus leading to a de facto unification of the government
and the UCT until 1958. As a reaction the private industry, which
was not as developed as the state sector, established the
Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ICI) in 1952.
The permanent overvaluation of the Turkish currency coupled with
a policy of trade liberalization, facilitated exorbitant profits
in importing and foreign exchange traffic, while it discouraged
investments in production capacity. This situation changed, when
prohibition and quota restrictions on formerly liberalized goods
were passed in order to cure balance of payments problems. Conse-
quently, new enterprises launched in the 1954-1953 period en-
tailing imports of know-how and product-specific technology.
Since such firms necessitated international linkages, it was
mainly the licenced importers of various commodity brands, so-
called importer-industrialists, and some multinational corpora-
tions that went ahead to produce non-durable consumer goods and
simple durables locally . Nevertheless, the import-substitution
industries did not really blossom until the end of the 1950s,
when the trade regime became increasingly restrictive.- 50 -
In the 1955-1958 period, the great profits in importing encou-
raged a violent competition in the distribution of quotas. As
most importable goods, i.e. luxury goods and durable consumer
goods, were subject to highly inelastic demand importers partly
favored the price-raising impact of the quota system . The
powerful members of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, in parti-
cular, benefitted from the corruption and favoritism which was
encouraged on the part of strategically placed officials and
ministers as a consequence of the competition for quotas
Furthermore, the lobbying activities of the Chambers of Industry
entailed attempts to secure increasingly higher quotas for in-
dustrialists thereby circumventing the purchase of imported raw
materials from merchant importers
The conflict between importers and industrialists intensified
with the implementation of planned import substitution. According
to the new trade regime, the UCT itself was entitled to distri-
bute import quotas among its members. This led the way for in-
creased trade restrictions, which were not to be attributed
solely to the industrialists
1 influence. The latter had emerged
very rapidly towards the end of the 1950s especially from the
rank of traders, such that by the end of the decade the Turkish
6 8 economy had a pool of second generation industrialists . This
new group consisted of importer-industrialists who, because of
trade barriers, were driven to start domestically manufacturing
of formerly imported commodities without generally abandoning
their import business. The majority of these industrial concerns
were family-owned and yet too small to encounter an effective
opposition against Istanbul-based importers. However, despite
competition in quota distribution, there was a confluence of
interests between importers and industrialists. The former would
like to have quotas imposed so that they can collect rents and
the manufacturers can benefit from the protective element of the
quota. This observation is derived theoretically by Wellisz and
Findlay (1984) for all developing countries. Thus, there was no
clash of interests on the appropriate development strategy,- 51 -
especially ISI, but rather a distributional struggle without
questioning protectionism or import substitution as such. The
position of importers changed in the mid-seventies, when import
quotas became increasingly restrictive and foreign exchange
earnings decreased. Thus, during the early sixties both
industrialists and importers promoted the idea of ISI. Officially
the UCT backed this trade policy by calling on the government "to
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seriously apply policies of import substitution" . The homo-
geneity of attitudes towards import substitution was also re-
flected in the relations between the UCT and the JP, which had
come to power after the 1965 elections. As the RPP was still led
by Ismet IncJnii, the leader from the etatist period, Demirel's JP
was backed by nearly all commercial groups and industrialists,
thereby becoming the heir of the DP.
3.2. The Collusion of Interests within the Institutional Setting
of ISI
The behavior and interest patterns of pressure groups, as they
have been sketched in the previous sections, are in line with the
hypotheses suggested in Section 1. The military participates in
the political power struggle in order to secure its economic and
political standing. Investment in capital-intensive industries
undertaken by OYAK, led the military to favor import substitu-
tion. The bureaucracy expected from ISI a higher budget for in-
vestment in SEEs, higher pay scales and new institutions, espe-
cially for planning. In contrast to the expectations voiced above
(p. 8) the landed oligarchy interests did not oppose ISI, since
they benefitted from the system through price support policies
and subsidization of inputs. Foreign interests generally favored
a more export-oriented policy. However, the OECD creditors
accepted import protection as an adequate measure to correct the
balance of payments situation. In addition, Turkey was not yet
heavily indebted, so that there was no serious opposition of the
foreign creditors against the policy regime. Finally, the busi-
ness circles were unanimously in favor of ISI. Industrialists
lobbied for protection of their products, while importers wanted
to capture the quota rent.- 52 -
It has to be noted, though, that trade protection was already
implemented, even before ISI became the official development
strategy. This protectionism, which was meant to correct the
balance of payments imbalances had generated a group of in-
dustrialists, which formed a lobby for ISI later on. This obser-
vation lends support to Hirschman's thesis that ISI is initially
not implemented as a development strategy but rather as an ad hoc
policy to correct severe balance of payments deficits.
Summing up, there was no pressure group opposing the implemen-
tation of ISI in Turkey. However, there was a competition in
rent-seeking between interest groups, which had different atti-
tudes towards the level and coverage of protection without
questioning ISI as such. The degree to which different pressure
groups were able to realize their self-interest depended on their
respective involvement in actual policy formulation.
Trade policy was implemented through mainly three trade policy
measures, namely the quota and licencing system, guarantee de-
posits as well as tariffs, taxes and subsidies. In a quota system
determined by import programs, the latter two instruments are of
minor importance. In the early 1960s, the quota and licencing
system was officially and legally determined by the following
organizations (Chart 3.1):
- the bureaucracy: SEEs, SPO and Central Bank;
- the Board of Ministers, i.e. the government;
-the business groups, as they were organized in the UCT and its
member chambers.
Other interest groups, i.e., the military, foreign creditors,
trade unions and landed groups were not entitled to participate
directly in the decision-making on import barriers. Given their
general acceptance of ISI, they had - at least in the early phase
- no reason to seek active participation or to oppose specific
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Note: The arrows show the direction of exerted power by the various groups and institutions.
indicates the inofficial linkages of influence, while indicates both offidal and inofficial
channels of influence.- 54 -
The quota and licencing system was at the center of interest for
bureaucrats, politicians and business circles. The UCT, SPO,
Central Bank and Board of Ministers jointly decided, how the
available foreign exchange were to be allocated on various import
categories. Furthermore, it was determined whether a category of
goods was eligible for importation or subject to a quota. This
was done after the Board of Ministers and the SPO had consulted
the management of the SEEs, while the UCT had consulted their
member chambers.
This system suffered from inherent distributional conflicts.
Firstly, there was a conflict between the private and the state
sector for quota allocations. Like the private sector the state
sector needed foreign exchange allocations in order to meet its
demand for imported intermediate products and investment goods.
Under the military rule and the RPP governments the state sector
was in a favorite position, since the old coalition between mili-
tary, bureaucracy and RPP favored the leading role of the state
sector. As power was gradually returned to the JP, the successor
of the DP, the private sector was favored against the state
sector, as it can be seen from Table 3.3. Between 1961 and 1968
the private sector increased its share of non-oil imports from
68.6 to 79.4 percent. The reason was that all private business-
men, who were mainly represented by the JP, formed a coalition
against the state sector.
Secondly, there was a conflict among business groups, namely the
importers and industrialists. When domestic production of a free-
ly importable good was established, each industrialist could
apply for import restrictions, i.e. the transfer of the respec-
tive commodity to the Quota List, or for an import ban, if it was
determined that the new producer's capacity was adequate to meet
domestic demand. Therefore, industrialists taken as a whole bene-
fitted in two ways from quota allocations in terms of effective
protection. On the one hand, the easier access to intermediate
products helped to reduce the costs of inputs; on the other hand,
imported inputs reduced the amount of foreign exchange available
for imports of finished products.- 55 -


























































Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, various issues.- 56 -
By contrast, the importers were interested in increasing the flow
of resaleable goods into the country and therefore, in keeping
finished goods on the list of eligible imports in order to cap-
ture the quota rents. The distribution of quotas for the private
sector was assigned to the UCT. Once an import program was pub-
lished, importers and industrialists were allowed to apply for a
quota allocation at their local chambers. However, the UCT did
not auction off quota allocations among individual chambers, as
it was prescribed legally. The large Chambers of Commerce and
Chambers of Industry could rather appropriate the quotas through
inofficial links to the government, as they are depicted in Chart
3.1. Thus, the system of protection provided numerous opportuni-
ties for the exploitation of insider information, favoritism, and
bribery
The performance of the quota system in Turkey does lend support
to earlier hypotheses with respect to rent-seeking behavior.
Firstly, rent-seeking in Turkey was indeed not completely compe-
titive, as assumed by Hong (1987) . The structure of the market
for quota allocation was oligopolistic because of considerable
barriers-to-entry erected by small and exclusive groups within
the UCT such as the chambers of the larger cities.
Secondly, there is virtually a sector, namely the influential
chambers, which fit Bhagwati's (1982) description as "directly
unproductive profit-seeking activities" (DUP). These chambers
invest considerable financial resources in lobbying activities.
Given the barriers-to-entry, rent-seeking has a built-in-tendency
to grow stronger as long as additional rents are larger than the
costs of rent-seeking. Thus, small and exclusive groups, which
can quickly exchange information and organize, are likely to
benefit from such a system.- 57 -
The industrialists have increased their share of private sector
quotas from 52 to 77 percent in 1962-1970 . This shows that
industrialists have successfully outcompeted their rivals, the
importers, in the political market. Another indicator for the
power of industrialists is the extension on import substitution
to an ever larger number of products. Evidence for such a protec-
tionist development is given in a study by Krueger (1974b) show-
ing a gradual shift from Liberalization Lists to Quota Lists and
72 from Quota Lists towards import bans- 58 -
4. Vested Interests in the Deepening of ISI
Subsequent to the establishment of ISI as an official development
strategy in the 19 60s, economic policies of the 1970s were
characterized by "second stage import substitution" (Section
2.5). It is the subject of this Section to show how a collusion
of special interests has affected this policy choice and how the
implementation of specific policies has influenced the goals of
major pressure groups. In particular, the focus is on side-




Towards the end of the 1960s, the military was again concerned
about the unity of the army as well as the economic and political
situation in general. As far as the unity of the armed forces was
concerned, the high command could not help being concerned about
the increased radicalism among officers. On the one hand, some
officers were suspected to collaborate with terrorist groups
from the left challenging the integration into NATO and question-
73 ing the treatment of the Kurdish minority . On the other hand,
some officers were associated with the NMP, which turned into a
fashist party under the leadership of some former NUC members.
After several warnings from high command officers, the military
again assumed power in March 1971. The military coup succeeded in
74 appeasing the radical factions in the army
Apart from that the military was concerned about the business
climate due to deterioration in industrial relations, balance of
payment problems, the foreign exchange gap, terrorism and above
all the disunity of the political parties dooming the executive
to impotence. The high command's concern about the business
climate was due to the military's growing participation in the
economic system. Since OYAK has been devoting more than half of
its assets to industrial and commercial investments, this organi-- 59 -
zation deliberately implanted itself in a particular type of
import substitution industrialization in the form of establish-
ing assembly plants and partnership with foreign capital.
Although it was initially planned to provide socio-economic
benefits that accrue to members of the armed forces, OYAK became
a large holding company with a prominence of import substituting
over export-oriented industries. Having a stake in the mixed
economy as promoted by the JP government, the military has con-
sequently developed a large interest in political and economic
stability. Thus, the coups of 1971 can be partly explained by the
military's attempt to preserve its economic and social standing.
In contrast to the 1961 take-over, the military coup was not
directed against the ruling party . Thus, the military's
interests during the period 1968-1973 can be summarized as
follows:
1. restoring "law and order", which included banning terrorism
and reducing strike activities;
2. the implementation of the 1970 reform package in order to
relax the foreign exchange situation;
3. continuing import substitution;
4. the restoration of the military's unity.
4.1.2 The Bureaucracy
During the late 1960s the role of the administration as a
pressure group was altered mainly because of two factors:
Firstly, rapid industrialization partly fostered by excessive
import substitution created alternative career possibilities in
the private sector, which were more prestiguous and better paid.
As a result of the JP' s preference for the private sector, the
bureaucrats suffered a loss in their social standing. Secondly,
the transition to planned import substitution was accompanied by
an uncontrolled growth of bureaucratic institutions. In the ab-
sence of careful specification of what was to be regulated, this
environment led to overregulation . As a consequence, corrup-- 60 -
tion and favoratism arose, becoming extremely widespread in the
local and lower rank administration, which was much more exposed
to political and physical pressures than the central bureau-
cracy . In the same vein, the SEEs became more dependent on the
78 political parties thereby reducing the competence of the SPO
Thus, the central and higher ranking administration was in-
creasingly isolated from the rest of the bureaucracy. The central
bureaucracy temporarily regained substantial political responsi-
bilities after the military intervention of 1970, since the armed
forces made use of the bureaucracy to depoliticize the country.
Since the military instituted a provisional government encompass-
ing technocrats, managers and bureaucrats, the bureaucracy took
an active part in the formulation of the development strategy.
The provisional government announced that priority was to be
given to heavy industry in order to escape the dependent in-
79 dustrialization . As heavy industry was an area reserved for the
state sector, the extension of ISI was meant to expand the re-
sponsilities of the SEEs and the respective planning bureau-
cracies. Thus, the bureaucracy lobbied for secondary import sub-
stitution.
4.1.3 The Landed Interests
The entire system of price support had been geared towards
Turkey's export structure and its import requirements of agri-
cultural products. On the one hand, government intervention put
an emphasis on Turkey's traditional export products, namely
raisins, hazelnuts, cotton and tobacco; on the other hand, the
government promoted the import substitution of sugar and wheat.
As this policy did not change during the 1960s, it helped to
preserve the structure of agricultural production. Other
products, mainly live stock, meat, fruit and vegetables were
discriminated, since these products were not eligible to subsi-
dization and price-support. However, these sectors were potential
exporters, though under the prevailing system smuggling was the
80 only means of export trade . Because of climatic conditions, the
producers of supported and discriminated products were located in- 61 -
different geographical areas. Hence, the landed sector was
divided on the issue of export-orientation and the prevailing
agricultural support system. The regionalism which resulted from
this division was further aggravated by the traditional patrons
1
loss of power. In the 1950s and early 1960s the patrons had the
monopoly on information,"while the majority of peasants were not
interested in politics. This situation changed during the late
1960s, when the rural population became interested in issues of
regional policy as a result of better education. As peasants
became increasingly aware that their vote had a price in material
benefits, especially when state resources became abundant, the
8 T clients became more demanding with respect to their patrons
Thus the patrons and their political representative had to come
up with investments in agricultural infrastructure, especially
irrigation, in order to settle the demands of the regional popu-
lation. This state support became even more important, when the
end of the land expansion led to an emphasis on measures raising
productivity.
Another issue of landed groups was the land reform, which became
topical after some land invasions by peasants who illegally
occupied state land and private property. Since the military
government of 1971 depended heavily on political parties, the
landlords, however, again managed to prevent the implementation
of the land reform.
The interests of the landed sector were less directed against ISI
as such. Instead, the demand of the landed sector covered
- increased investment in rural infrastructure;
- extension of the price-support system;
- higher subsidies for agricultural inputs to promote the
modernization of agriculture.- 62 -
4.1.4 Foreign Creditors
The balance of payments crisis of 1970 was again solved with
assistance of the IMF and the OECD. The latter regarded a policy
8 2 of export-orientation as the only long-term solution . In the
same vein, the IMF conditionality included a devaluation and
measures of export promotion. Being hit by the foreign exchange
gap, the debtors, mainly the Turkish government, had an interest
in obtaining more aid and loans on preferable terms, even though
the government had to stick to adjustment programs as stipulated
by IMF conditionality. The implementation of each stabilization
package was followed by a military take-over. The policies
pursued by the post-coup regimes were invariably more in line
with the demands of international financial institutions. How-
ever, once the flow of foreign funds was restored due to an
increase in exports, aid and loans, the government simply resumed
its former policies. While the 1958 measures had been followed by
price stability and a recession, the 1970 measures brought about
increased inflation and a rapid increase in production. Thus, the
pressure which the foreign creditors were able to exert on the
Turkish government was only of short-term relevance.
4.1.5 Trade Unions
In the 1960s, trade unionism suddenly became more important,
which can be attributed to three factors.
Firstly, the 1961 constitution guaranteed the right for strike
and collective bargaining. Trade unions managed to escape from
corporatist control. Secondly, Tt)RK-I§ refrained from siding with
a particular party in order to maintain a favorable bargaining
position vis-a-vis the government. In addition, non-partisan
trade unions were given substantial financial support by AFLCIO,
OECD, ICFTV and AID. The third and presumably most important
factor was the upcoming of import substitution leading to a fast
increase in urban wage labor. Workers were employed in plants
with steadily growing production scales. Given this environment,- 63 -
TURK-IS found it easy to effectively organize strikes resulting
in considerable real wage increases between 1964 and 1969, as it
can be obtained from Table 4.1.
In this situation, the employers of the private sector realized
that the regionally organized UCT was not a suitable platform for
collective bargaining and lobbying for (or against) labor laws.
Hence, the nucleus of the Istanbul based employers founded the
Turkish Confederation of Employers
1 Associations (TISK) based on
industry-type organizations. Since TISK had a legal monopoly on
private sector representation, it was in a position to fix manda-
tory maximum levels with respect to wages and working conditions
for all its members. Due to its organizational power and its
hostility towards labor unions, TISK adopted an increasing mili-
tancy in collective bargaining.
This and the growing role of private sector enterprises brought
about a segmentation in TURK-IS. Most of the trade unionists
represented the majority of political attitudes of workers. The
centre-right unionists frankly sympathized with the JP. The
social-democratic opposition within TURK-IS favored the RPP. Both
groups reflected the moderate majority in TURK-IS, which lobbied
for protectionism and supported the concept of a mixed economy
with strong but non-partisan trade unions. In contrast, the third
group, which encompassed members of the newly founded Turkish
Labour Party (TLP) adopted a more radical view based on marxist
ideology. According to this group union activities should not be
restricted to collective bargaining but also to political en-
forcement of socialism and a nationalization of the economy. This
group constituted the nucleus, which founded the Confederation of
Revolutionary Trade Unions (DISK) in 1967.
Due to its radical outfit DISK was able to attract large numbers
of workers mainly from the private sector. The industrial member-
ship was concentrated primarily in the metal, machinery, rubber,
pharmaceutical, and petroleum industries. These were the capital
goods and intermediate goods sectors that had absorbed the bulk- 64 -
Table 4.1: Wages of Workers registered at the Social Insurance Organization
Average in Current Prices Cost of Living
Index


































































































































Note: The deflator is the Istanbul wage-earners' cost-of-living index as it is defined
by the Istanbul Chamber of Cannerce.
Source: Statistical Yearbook, various years; TUSIAD (1984) .- 65 -
of new employment and investment in private industry due to
planned import substitution. According to a study by Bianchi
(1984), these sectors contain the largest work sites, the biggest
concentration of foreign capital and technology imports, the
highest profit and productivity as well as the highest protec-
tionism in the private sector. They also encompassed the
country's largest best-financed, and most militant employers'
unions.
In contrast, conservative unionists covered in TURK-IS were more
dominant in consumer goods industries, such as textiles, cloth-
ing, food processing and beverages. In these areas TURK-IS was
aided by preexisting well-financed parent unions mostly organized
in the state sector.
The foundation of DISK initiated a sudden increase in strike
activities mostly in the private sector, which were followed by
considerable real wage increases (see Tables 4.1 und 4.2). In
order to keep up with DISK's increasing popularity, TISK had to
adapt a more radical policy leading to an increase in strike
activities. Nevertheless, the increase in strike is also due to
DISK's engaging in political issues. Gumriikcu (1981) shows that
less than half of these strikes were directly related to the
collective bargaining process, while the remaining part was due
to political demonstrations against price increases, labor laws,
lock-outs, NATO, etc. In these respects, DISK was not more than
the means, by which a small political party attempted to increase
its political effectiveness.
As TISK did not succeed in stopping its competitor's upswing, the
moderate unionists attempted to enforce corporatist control on
DISK. In 1970, TISK, TURK-IS, the JP and later the military
government tried to implement a law that would have practically
given TORK-IS the monopoly on union representation. The legis-
lative initiative was given up, as DISK further increased its
strike activities. Nevertheless, the military succeeded in re-
ducing strikes for a while and abolished the TLP. As a conse-
quence, DISK turned towards the RPP that had already shifted to
left-of-centre.Table 4.2: Strike Activities in the Turkish Economy/ 1965-1980
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980






































































































































































































































































Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey.- 67 -
Even the authoritarian rule implemented by the military was not
sufficient to liquidate DISK as a pressure group. The persistance
of DISK was due to its support from the party system, i.e. the
RPP, which had not been affected by the military coup. However,
trade unionism was generally weakened under the military coup, so
that the employers temporarily succeeded in taking advantage of
the restrictions on strike.
Since the March 1971 coup TISK members increasingly tended to cut
short the collective-bargaining process through well-financed
industrywide lockouts. It was interesting to note, that large
industrialists, as organized in TUSIAD dissociated themselves
8 3 from military government and TISK's hardening position
The disputes of employers on the one hand and the division of
unions on the other added to the organizational inefficiencies of
the collective bargaining process. However, the division of labor
unions did not change their general inclination towards ISI.
Since heavy industrialization was the source of the unions'
84 power, they promoted secondary import substitution
4.1.6 Business Groups
Towards the end of the 1960s there were two lines of segmentation
in the UCT. Firstly, there was the division between in-
dustrialists and importers at the national level. And secondly,
there was a regional conflict between the Anatolian chambers
representing the numerous small-scale enterprises and the Izmir
and Istanbul chambers which encompass the largest industrial and
commercial holding companies.
The competition for quota allocations between industrialists and
importers finally led to a cleavage on the degree of import
substitution. Despite their numerical underrepresentation in the
UCT General Assembly the industrialists managed to increase their
share of user-specific quota allocations considerably throughout
the 1960s,, as it is shown in Table 4.3. The reason was that- 68 -





























































Note: Percentage shares of total user-specific allocations are given in
parentheses under the absolute numbers. Quotas since 1971 had been valid for
the entire year, while earlier import programs were published semi-annually.
Apart frcm that, increase in user-specific allocations to importers and
industrialists is due to shifts from global quotas to specific quotas.
Source: Krueger (1974), BfA (1975), Barkey (1984a), own calculations.- 69 -
import substitution was an issue that united industrialists who
became increasingly stronger, both politically and economically.
On the whole, ISI was still a strategy favored by most in the
business community, even though the Istanbul and Izmir Chamber of
Commerce, to which most of the importers belonged, became in-
creasingly reserved. The problem for importers did not primarily
originate from the lack of foreign trade due a ban on imports.
The increase in domestic production created new possibilities and
opportunities in immediately related areas, such as complementary
or intermediate products, leading to an expansion of import
trade. Thus, importers not allayed with continous adjustments and
diversification were squeezed out or escaped this trend by becom-
8 5 ing importer-industrialist . Eventually, opposition to this kind
of excessively growing import substitution was solely centered on
large chambers such as the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, which
themselves constituted a minority in the UCT.
As a result, the industrialists as a whole were in a position to
push through their views on ISI against commercial interests.
However, this alliance of interests between industrialists proved
to be comparatively short-lived, as consumer goods industries
reached their maturation phase at the end of the 1960s. The "next
stage of import substitution had already been envisaged in the
Assembly Industry Guidelines (Montaj Sanayi Talimatnamesi)
published in 1964 putting emphasis on consumer durables pro-
duction, i.e. automobiles and domestic appliances. The assembly
industries, mainly an Istanbul phenomenon, initially assembled
imported parts, which were planned to be gradually substituted
for domestic inputs. This form of import substitution and its
protection by the government resulted in a severe dispute on the
direction of the Turkish industrialization leading to a serious
division among industrialists within the UCT. Proponents of the
assembly industry were mainly represented by the Istanbul and
Izmir Chambers of Industry, while the opponent Anatolian cham-
bers, mainly represented by the Eskisehir Chamber of Industry
questioned its beneficial impact maintaining that it would lead
to increased importation.- 70 -
Thus, on the one hand the two big chambers of industry found
themselves outvoted by the large number of Anatolian chambers,
while on the other hand the latter expressed their resentment to
hegemony of large capital, which smaller enterprises had little
Q C
means of competing with .. The regional concentration given in
Table 4.4 underlines the regional nature of this conflict. The
Eskisehir Chamber of Industry, which considered itself as the
representative of the numerous Anatolian chambers, proposed a
different kind of import substitution geared towards the whole
economy instead of producing for high income levels. In a so-
called "Manifesto of the Socially Conscious Industrialist"
published 1970 it was called for increased investments in inter-
mediate and capital good production, while consumption levels
8 7 should be reduced . These were sectors, in which the late-comers
to import substitution expected opportunities for expansion.
Despite these basic differences in opinion the Union of Chambers
of Industry, which was an unofficial union of all industrialists
within the UCT, reached a compromise position regarding the pro-
88 posals for the Fourth Five Year Development Plan .This com^-
promise included both deepening and consumer durable production.
In fact, this regional conflict was rooted in the unequal distri-
bution of quotas, the large majority of which had been alloted to
large industrialists and merchants of the three or four big
89
cities . The regional divisions were accentuated by the dis-
persion pattern of assembly industries.. In addition, smaller
enterprises, especially industrialists, were short of lending
facilities. The financial sector collected the savings in
Anatolian banks and transferred these funds to urban areas, since
the urban based import business offered lower risk, higher
returns and short maturities.
The regional issue erupted politically when the Islamic funda-
mentalist Erbakan, who became the founder of the NSP, was elected
Secretary-General of the UCT due to a majority of Anatolian
chambers in the General Assembly. This led to a defensive coali-
tion between the large chambers of commerce and chambers of- 71 -



















































Note: Data have been derived from the list of the top 500 published by the
Istanbul Chamber of Industry from which 79 SEEs were extracted.
Source: Istanbul Chamber of Industry (1981).- 72 -
industry, that felt equally endangered by Erbakan's anti-Western
90 bias . Furthermore, Prime Minister Demirel who was concerned
about the UCT's getting out of the JP's control exerted indirect
pressure on Erbakan by refusing to release some of the quota
allocations. The Justice Party leadership eventually was success-
91 ful in driving Erbakan out of the UCT and the JP . Even though
Erbakan was removed from the Union presidency, Demirel had proved
to be a close ally of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, thus
giving up JP's monopoly regarding the political representation of
the entire UCT. As a result, some smaller parties, whose members
had partly defected from the JP, emerged as representatives of
the Anatolian chambers exploiting existing disputes.
The relationship between the large chambers and the JP deterio-
rated, as Demirel and Ozal, the head of the SPO agreed on a 66%
devaluation, as it was envisaged in the 1970 stabilization pro-
gram negotiated with the creditors and the IMF. In this respect
both industrialists and importers had a vested interest. The
government tried to sell the stabilization package to the manu-
facturing sector as a means of insuring foreign exchange avail-
ability and international capital transfers. However, in-
dustrialists, i.e. groups related to the assembly industries,
believed that the devaluation was a deliberate policy measure
undertaken by the government to scuttle the private sector.
Instead the industrialists proposed a policy termed as an
"export-oriented adjustment of the exchange rate with some custom
adjustments", which was equivalent to export and tax rebates as
92 '
well as a special exchange rate for exporters . The concerns of
the industrialists were partly justified, since organized labor
was expected to ask for wage increases, leading to an accelera-
tion of inflation, while the government was expected to block
price increases.
The 1970 stabilization measures, which were eventually imple-
mented by the military, were the very first half-hearted approach
of a civilian government to alter the existing strategy of import
substitution against substantial pressure from all industrialist
93 chambers , which formerly were among the key supporters of- 73 -
Demirel. Furthermore, commercial chambers had fallen out of
favor with Demirel over his decision to end Istanbul importers'
long dominance over the UCT presidency giving industrialists a
greater representation which was intended to reconcile them with
the JP.
The inability of the private sector to agree on a common policy
weakened the UCT as a pressure group. Hence, after the 1971 mili-
tary coup the technocrats dominating the "above party" cabinet
were in a position to remove the UCT's authority to distribute
94 quota allocations transferring it to the Ministry of Trade
Large industrialists welcomed this move, as by implication com-
mercial interests and small chambers were excluded and the UCT
lost almost all their power vis-ci-vis their membership. At about
the same time the 12 largest industrialists in the country
initiated the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Asso-
95 ciation (TUSIAD) . Its 106 members, with a few exceptions
Istanbul-based private businessmen, encompassed the assembly
industry as well as the large-sale holding companies, that had
emerged during the early phase of import substitution. Most of
these holdings were highly diversified both in the vertical and
horizontal sense, so that some of their subsidiaries were engaged
in import substitution and others were oriented towards exports.
Due to their size they had acquired informal channels of access
9 fi to various deputies, newspapers and the government . Unlike the
UCT, the TUSIAD was intended to rely only on these inofficial
links never devoting itself to parties and politicians but
formulating economic policy recommendations.
Hence, business groups were divided into three groups in 1970,
which formed coalitions against each other to foster their
respective concepts of economic policy. The small chambers were
interested in secondary import substitution, whereas the re-
presentatives of the large companies opposed the idea of extend-
ing ISI to basic input and machinery production. Furthermore,
importers questioned ISI as a whole, since they were crowded out
by the industrialists' importation of goods. As a result the- 74 -
importers and large industrialists formed a coalition against
secondary import substitution, while large and small in-
dustrialists jointly lobbied against trade liberalization and
devaluations.
The division of the private sector was reflected in the fragmen-
tation of the JP, the party, which traditionally represented the
business groups in parliament. Thus, the inability of the JP to
decide on a set of policies can be related to the business
group's cleavages on import substitution.
4.2 The Collusion of Interests leading to the Continuing of ISI
In the 1970s the pressure groups were clearly less united on the
issue of ISI than in the 1960s. The military intervened in order
to improve the business climate leaving the party system un-
touched. Since the economic standing of the military depended on
the continuing of ISI they did not opt for trade liberalization.
Since OYAK was a large industrial holding company, the military's
interest was closer to TUSIAD than to the Anatolian chambers. As
the military preferred to rule indirectly, they virtually adapted
a neutral position between these two business groups. The bureau-
cracy rather preferred a deepening of ISI, especially through
heavy investment into SEEs. In this respect they were supported
by the trade unions, which proposed heavy industrialization and
nationalization. Despite their division, trade unions were still
united on the question of secondary ISI, since this policy pro-
mised to increase the labor unions' power in society.
The landed interests took a neutral position, though some of
their potential exporters were discriminated. Their electorate
pressure was more directed at increased subsidization rather than
trade liberalization. The foreign creditors lost their influence,
once new loans had been disbursed alleviating the foreign
exchange gap.- 75 -
On the whole business groups were still united on the rejection
of trade liberalization. Nevertheless, the particular business
groups were divided on the questions of ISI. Importers lobbied
for less than prohibitive quotas, which were the source of their
income. The small Anatolian industrialists lobbied for secondary
import substitution, while the large urban industrialists were
interested in the importation of intermediate goods and machinery
in order to protect the assembly industries.
This runs contrary to the theory, according to which the large
urban companies attempt to carry through secondary import sub-
stitution against the pressure exerted by numerous small in-
dustrialists. According to Olson, the small, exclusive and power-
ful organization is a more efficient and effective lobby than the
sizeable and less powerful organizations. Nevertheless, this
concept neglects the effects of voting power, which was quite
important in the 1970s, as the military left the party system
untouched. Since the group of small industrialists inhered much
more voting power than the TUSIAD members, the power between
these groups was quite balanced.
Thus, the resulting government policy depended on other groups,
i.e. the bureaucracy and the trade unions. The bureaucracy had
come to power as a result of the military, which rendered
government to a cabinet of bureaucrats. The head of this cabinet,
Prime Minister Erim, stated that priority would be given to heavy
97 industry . This cabinet, which proved to be short-living, was
followed by an elected coalition government encompassing the RPP
and the NSP. The RPP was backed by the bureaucrats and the trade
unions. The bureaucrats were traditionally associated with the
RPP, while the trade unions for the first time used their voting
power in favor of the socialist RPP. The islamic-fundamentalist
NSP was supported by the Anatolian chambers, especially Eski^ehir
and Ankara, as well as the East Anatolian landed groups. Although
the RPP and the NSP were two adverse poles of the party system,
they were able to implement a set of policies reflecting the
interests of pressure groups. The RPP-NSP coalition agreed on- 76 -
increased investments in heavy industries, especially in Ana-
tolia. In fact, the public sector shares of non-oil imports
increased temporarily from 20.6 to 35.1 percent between 1968 and
1972, which was a consequence of the SEE's investments in heavy
98 industries
The extent of secondary import substitution should be also re-
flected in the structure of effective protection, as it is given
in Table 4.5. Consumer goods, such as textiles and ceramics are
among the best protected products. This does also apply to the
steel and plastic industry. However, machinery, i.e. transformers
and motor pumps, and chemicals are not protected at all. Thus,
secondary import-substitution was fostered especially in the
production of basic inputs. Protection tends to be higher in
industries, in which the private sector is more heavily engaged.
This should be due to the fact that the industrialists re-
presented by the NSP depended heavily on inputs provided by the
SEEs.
Summing up, it can be concluded that the policies followed by the
government reflected the interest of the relevant pressure
groups. It is evident that in a competitive party system groups
with considerable voting power, i.e. small companies and trade
unions, have a better position vis-a-vis small and exclusive
groups, such as large industrialists.- 77 -
Table 4.5: Effective Rate of Protection for Selected Projects 1972-1973
























































Source: World Bank (1973), Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1981; own calcula-
tions.- 78 -
5. Vested Interests in Trade Liberalization
This chapter assesses the role of interest groups in the process
of trade liberalization from 1977 until 1984. Following preceding
chapters, the first section derives the standpoint of various
interest groups and their respective factions towards measures of
trade liberalization. Thereafter, the actual liberalization pro-
cess is compared to the policy demands of major interest groups.
5 .1 Pressure Groups
5.1.1 The Military
During the seventies the multi-party system had fragmented into
numerous rival groupings and parties. Due to the tight affi-
liations between particular parties and high military officers,
this fragmentation was reflected in political cleavages in the
99
armed forces . Hence, the military was concerned about the poli-
tical impotence of the multi-party system and its direct impact
on the military
Furthermore, the military was also affected by deteriorations of
the political and economic situation in general. The outburst of
violence after 1975, which was followed by a declaration of
martial law, gave the army a leading role in the maintenance of
order. In addition, the armed forces were concerned about the
business climate, which deteriorated because of continued foreign
exchange gaps, tensions in industrial relations, and declining
growth rates. As OYAK became the second biggest industrial hold-
ing company in Turkey and an influential member of TUSIAD, there
was a set of common interests among large industrialists and
**• 101 officers
Apart from OYAK, the military had an additional interest in eco-
nomic policy-making. In the secondary phase of import substi-
tution the military leaders exerted pressure on the Ministry of- 79 -
Defense in order to promote the development of a national arms
industry. The respective projects conducted by SEEs have so far
not only survived the liberalization efforts, but seem to be of
growing importance. In this respect, military leaders have been
successfully lobbying for import substitution.
As in 1971, the 1980 military coup can be explained as an attempt
to restore law and order and preserve the military's economic and
social standing. As in the coups before, the military intervened
in a state of economic and political crisis. However, inter-
ventions did not take place before economic reform packages had
been implemented. The risk awareness of the military remained
always geared to keeping its traditional reputation in the public
while avoiding internal conflicts, that were perceived to harm
its homogeneity. As in all instances, the military was to return
the power to civilian governments. However, the military
government did not retreat, unless it had carried through some
political and economic changes. Firstly, the multi-party system
was reformed, after all existing parties and their leading poli-
ticians had been banned. As before, the military had an idea of a
directed democracy controlled by a military president and a
military-controlled party, the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP),
which, however, was not supported in the 1983 elections.
As far as economic-policy making was concerned, the military was
interested in an improvement of the business climate, which
especially involved
- banning terrorism and all other illegal activities in the
shadow economy;
- a reduction of strike activities;
- improvement of the balance of payments situation, especially
the foreign exchange gap.- 80 -
5.1.2 The Bureaucracy
During the 1970s party policies invaded all of the bureaucratic
institutions. Governments or rather parties making up a coalition
did not confine themselves to bringing their own teams to the
upper ranks of the civil service. The reshuffling involved all
ranks, while the number of bureaucrats increased rapidly fostered
102 by all political parties including the radical groupings . The
lower and local administration had already been suffering from
accelerating polarization in the late 1960s, as it was discussed
in chapter 4.1. During the 1970s, in addition, the security
forces and the jurisdiction suffered from partisanship
Furthermore, the SEEs got under complete government control being
abused as "employers of the last resort" and as provisions of
104 management posts for party members . Party policies became also
dominant in the ministeries, where parties actually managed to
gain the complete control in a particular ministery depending on
the posts that had been negotiated in the short-lived coali-
tions . Even the strongest institution, the SPO, became politi-
cally involved, since the political parties realized the oppor-
tunities resulting from the SPO's broad competence. After a
sudden increase of its staff in the beginning of 1980, the SPO
became completely controlled by the government . By implication
the widespread partisanship led to a worsening of relations
between the bureaucracy and the military. Thus, after the mili-
tary coup of 1980, the existing bureaucracy was not strengtened
as it had been in the preceding coups. In contrary, the bureau-
cracy ceased to be factor in politics, since the military removed
a large number of bureaucrats from their positions . Since the
civil servants had been closely associated with the political
parties, the bureaucrats lost their power base, when all poli-
tical parties were banned.
Nevertheless, the military had to rely on a few technocrats who
had been associated with international organizations like the IMF
and the World Bank. This group of technocrats, which was
organized around Ozal, the head of the SPO, helped to settle the- 81 -
relationship with the international creditors, which was in the
interest of the military. For this reason, this small group of
high-ranking bureaucrats had been endowed with wide competence
concerning the stabilization program and economic policy-making
in general. The majority of bureaucrats still favored ISI, since
the foundation of institutions they were working for dated back
108 to the 1930s and 1960s . In contrast, this very small number of
technocrats rather favored an export-oriented strategy. Not more
than 10 high-ranking bureaucrats succeeded in implementing the
1980 stabilization program despite the opposition coming from the
109 rest of the bureaucracy
There remains the question to what extent trade liberalization
and the associated deregulation could go in harmony with the
interest of bureaucrats. Firstly, most of the technocrats de-
liberately turned from bureaucrats into politicians. The poli-
tical vacuum due to the ban on all parties provided the perfect
opportunity to step into the political market. The managers of
the stabilization program were quite aware of the fact that their
political careers were much more promising, if they followed a
strategy of export orientation, thus serving the interests of the
military and the large holding companies and the foreign credi-
tors. Moreover, the political technocrats were quite aware that
their fortune was determined by the foreign creditors who favored
trade liberalization.
Secondly, after the 1983 election Ozal, now as Prime Minister,
reformed the entire government and administration. As a result,
high-ranking posts were given to US-trained economists, who have
been replacing the majority of lawyers and engineers in the pub-
lic sector. Since these new technocrats have all been appointed
directly by Ozal, they are in line with the strategy of cautious
export orientation, as it is followed by the MP government. Thus,
the high-ranking bureaucracy is under the control of the govern-
ment.- 82 -
Thirdly, towards the end of the 1970s the bureaucracy became
directly involved in the economic system. Just like the military,
the higher-ranking bureaucrats had organized a pension fund
called MEYAK (Memurlar Yardimlayma Kurumu), which gave credits to
large holding" companies or acquired shares in them . Unlike
OYAK this fund has so far remained quite exclusive, as it was
managed by members of the higher-ranking bureaucracy. Although
MEYAK as a holding gained much less importance than OYAK, it
helped to harmonize the interests of bureaucrats with the needs
of the big holding corporations, as represented by TUSIAD. MEYAK
has put an emphasis on credits and portfolio investments. Since
it could not really unfold its activities during 1970s for poli-
tical reasons, it did not engage in heavy industries, as it was
demanded by the RPP, but rather into private companies with a
prominence of exports over import substitution.
Hence, despite their weak position as a pressure group the
technocrats had an inclination towards trade liberalization,
while the inward-oriented part of the bureaucracy lost its
political influence.
5.1.3 The Landed Interests
The rent-seeking activities of the landed class as well as rising
demand for agricultural products due to excessive import substi-
tution had caused an inward orientation of the agricultural
sector. This worsened the foreign exchange gap, as the agricul-
tural sector was the main source financing the structural import,
needs of the import-substituting industries. However, even the
landed sector was affected by the shortage of foreign exchange,
when the supply of agricultural inputs had to be rationed.
In general, the landed groups objected the stabilization program,
since trade liberalization involved a removal of price support
and subsidies. However, a small group of agricultural producers,
whose products were distributed and exported by the private sec-
tor, had an interest in trade liberalization.- 83 -
Given these clashes of interest between various groups of pro-
ducers and regions, the landed sector was a sizeable and hetero-
geneous pressure group. This heterogeneity was also reflected in
the parties. As the JP sided with urban commercial and industrial
groups, independent candidates and minor parties received a much
larger sha
stability.
larger share of votes , thereby adding to the political in-
When the military government banned all existing parties in 1980,
the influence of the landed sector was virtually removed. The
authoritarian government facilitated trade liberalization leading
to an export boom in agricultural products. In this respect, the
landed sector agreed to the stabilization program. However, the
military implemented a tax reform, according to which agriculture
was no longer exempted from taxation. Moreover, the implemen-
tation of the land reform was again at stake.
Thus, it was only consequent for the landed groups to support
Ozal in the election campaign 1983, since he was a former NSP
candidate, the architect of the liberalization package and an
opposition against the military-backed parties. Despite the
gradual disappearance of traditional patron-clientel relation-
ships the rural groups have remained a crucial factor in elec-
tions .
5.1.4 Foreign Creditors
Table 5.1 and 5.2 show that debt accumulation increased moderate-
ly during the early seventies after the stabilization program of
19 70. Towards the end of the seventies, foreign debt grew con-
siderably under the prevailing crisis condition. The effect of
this growing indebtedness was that economic policy-making became
more and more affected by the interests of the creditors and IMF
conditionalities.- 84 -
Table 5.1: External Debt, 1970-1985 (US$ Billions)
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Table 5.2: Public and Publicly Guaranteed Long-Term Debt, 1970,1985




































































Source: World Bank (1987), World Debt Tables.- 85 -
The political relations between Turkey and its NATO partners,
however, have been subject to considerable tension constraining
the supply of credits. For instance, the Cyprus conflict of 1974,
the subsequent arms embargo by the U.S., the Turkish reluctance
to agree on the establishment of new military bases as well as
the attempts of Ecevit to cooperate with the Soviet Union led to
serious frictions between Turkey and the USA.
In this sense, the 1977-1980 crisis was different, as indebted-
ness and respective dependency on foreign creditors were extreme-
ly high, while there was considerable political tension between
Turkey and the creditor countries. Since no bilateral or multi-
lateral creditor was willing or able to meet the extraordinary
financial requirements of the Turkish economy, the institutions
involved rather preferred a tight coordination of the creditors
1
demands, as it was later institutionalized in the Latin American
cases
However, this coordination was not to be established within
organizations such as NATO and EC for obvious political reasons.
Thus, the OECD was assigned the task to coordinate the bilateral
committments of the particular creditor countries. In 1979, the
respective work group was given additional competence, as it had
to negotiate the agreements and supervise its performance in
cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank.
In the same vein, the 230 private banks faced reschedulings and
additional requirements, which until that time were rather
exceptional. Private creditors became increasingly important
between 1975 and 1980, as workers' remittances declined and
Export-Import Bank loans were not available any more as a result
of the Cyprus crisis. This sharp increase was facilitated by the
so-called Deposits Convertible to Foreign Exchange (DCFE = Dovize
Cevrilebilir Mevduat), which was aimed at using state guarantees
to rapidly obtain large amounts of foreign exchange attracting
the savings of migrant workers. However, the principal depositors
turned out to be foreign commercial banks. Hence, during this- 86 -
period the DCFE virtually became a channel for borrowing by the
Turkish private sector in European money markets, which provided
half of the disbursements of foreign debt . Under the prevail-
ing crisis conditions commercial banks constituted a steering
committee under the leadership of the Citibank. Although commer-
cial banks were in principle willing to support a possible
stabilization package, they were only prepared to agree on re-
schedulings rather than on additional loans in the negotiations.
Furthermore, all agreements were tied to a stand-by agreement
negotiated with the IMF, since its tough conditionalities were
regarded as an insurance to restore Turkey's ability to pay.
Thus, the political influence of foreign creditors centered
around the IMF as the most important institution.
The Turkish government under Demirel had contacted the IMF well
before the illiquidity crisis of 1977, since it became obvious
that without an immediate solution of the balance of payment
issues GNP growth rates of 8% as given in the plan could not be
realized. Although the government aimed at additional long-term
loans, only a Compensatory Financing Facility was given. As IMF
conditionalities (an 18 percent devaluation, an immediate repay-
ment of mature debt and a reduction of government expenditures)
were not fulfilled as agreed on in a letter of intent, a stand-by
arrangement did not come into effect. In addition, the World Bank
refused to give any more credits until the 1977 elections. The
relations between the IMF and the World Bank, on the one hand,
and the Demirel cabinet on the other, were hindered by the NSP
and its attacks against what it called the "Western Club". Even-
tually the National Front government broke down, partly a result
114 of the dispute over the stand-by agreement .
To spare itself a protracted war of attrition in its negotiations
with the IMF the new Ecevit government implemented a sweeping
devaluation. Given this precondition the IMF released a stand-by
agreement for two years, which facilitated a debt rescheduling
with the OECD creditors. However, the RPP government did not
manage to harmonize the conditionalities and the demands of its- 87 -
broad electoral base, when economic indicators deteriorated in
the course of 1978. When the Ecevit government failed to meet the
conditionality, the debt reschedulings negotiated with commercial
banks became impossible. As the negotiations with the IMF were
entirely interrupted, the Ecevit government unsuccessfully tried
to attach loans from the Soviet Union and Arab oil producers.
As a result of the Iranian crisis the OECD succeeded in a con-
tinuation of negotiations with the IMF. Apart from rescheduling,
fresh money was provided by the OECD, commercial banks and the
World Bank. However, the oil shock frustrated all efforts of the
RPP government to stick to the conditionalities. Finally, Ecevit
had to resign.
Although Demirel's new government immediately relaxed the stabi-
lization measures, Ozal engaged in inofficial talks with the IMF
on a medium-term stand-by agreement. When the 24 January Stabili-
zation Package was first presented to the public, the new govern-
ment was officially in a position to claim that it acted inde-
pendently. After these measures had been fixed in a letter of
intent, the IMF released a three-year stand-by agreement, which
was followed by two short-term agreements. This agreement to-
gether with the political stability brought about by the military
coup facilitated a medium-term adjustment process, supported by
the OECD, the World Bank and the commercial banks. The military
government took over the conditionalities, leaving Ozal in office
in order to demonstrate continuity. Moreover, backed by a com-
fortable majority in the 1983 elections, Ozal has been able to
meet the demands of the IMF and the foreign creditors.
Hence, in 1980, the pressure of the foreign creditors against ISI
was much more intense and persisting than it had been during the
1958 and 1970 crisis. As the multilateral creditors proposed a
medium-term structural adjustment program, there was less scope
for the government to escape this pressure by relaxing its
adjustment program.- 88 -
5.1.5 Trade Unions
Towards the end of the seventies, strike activities reached a
climax, although trade unions had lost some ground. Due to grow-
ing overcapacities and lacking inputs, many employers preferred
to lock out workers and save wage payments than to agree to
higher wages. As real wages declined, DISK concentrated mainly on
political demonstrations against stabilization programs. In this
respect, DISK had become a decisive power bloc, which the RPP
government had to negotiate with. In addition, the number of
trade unions and federations allied with political parties
increased rapidly leading to a split in labor interests (see
Table 5.3) and to political turmoil, which weakened the labor
unions as a whole. Since every party in parliament was associated
with at least one union, organized labor still exerted consider-
able voting-power, which was a decisive factor and an opposition
against stabilization programs and attempts of trade liberali-
zation.
This situation changed with the military coup. Since the military
banned all parties, the trade unions lost their voting-power. The
military coup of 1980 came to the relief of TISK as most of its
proposals were realized by the military as there were:
- prohibition of all unions except TURK-IS;
- prohibition of political activities of trade unions;
- granting strikes as a constitutional right, as long as it did
not "harm the economy or public interest".
TURK-IS was to survive as it was not clearly associated with a
political party. However, trade unions were not allowed to start
their restricted activities before 1984, when important measures
of trade liberalization had already been implemented.
The liquidation of powerful unions brought about serious real
wage losses that were essential for the success of Ozal's li-
beralization effort. Ozal himself is a former representative of
TISK, so that despite recent strikes, changes in trade union
legislation are not to be expected.-89 -
Table 5.3: Major Labor Confederations in Turkey
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Thus, the economic role of the armed forces has been most effec-
tive with respect to restoring orderly industrial relations by
siding with the business groups. The rise of trade unionism was
facilitated by the democratic environment in the 1960s and 1970s.
The radicalization of industrial relations increased with up-
coming ISI especially at its secondary stage. In contrast, the
authoritarian regimes prevailing from 1971-1973 and 1980-1983
were capable of limiting trade unionism. The trade unions' loss
of power was of considerable importance with respect to the
distributional struggle associated with the stabilization pro-
grams and trade liberalization in general.
5.1.6 Business Groups
During the 1970s the division of the private sector aggravated,
since the business groups, which were formerly represented by the
UCT, splintered mainly into two separate organizations:
- TUSIAD, the representative of the large conglomerates;
- UCT encompassing the bulk of smaller companies.
The propagated goal of the Istanbul-led TUSIAD has been to force
the Turkish industry out of its protectionist environment by
making it competitive in foreign markets. This strategy called
for increased capital concentration in order to expand capacity
moving away from producing high-priced, low-quality consumer
goods for domestic markets to exporting competitive consumer
items. The foreign exchange earned from industrial as well as
traditional agricultural commodities was intended to facilitate
large-scale importation of technology needed to equip private
industry for the production of intermediate and capital goods,
which had been formerly assigned to the SEEs. The position of
TUSIAD was a response to secondary import substitution, in which
mainly the Anatolian enterprises and SEEs were engaged. Hence,
after the early phase of ISI the large conglomerates looked for
new growth potentials and found these industries occupied by SEEs
and small enterprises. In addition, the assembly industries in
TUSIAD felt threatened by a growing dependency on locally pro-- 91 -
duced, highly protected inputs. For this reason, TUSIAD pretended
to follow an export-oriented strategy, though its member com-
panies were still geared towards ISI until the end of the 1970s.
The reaction of that segment of the industrialists that did not
belong to the TUSIAD was unclear. On the one hand, they expected
industrialist interests to be strengthened, while on the other
they had to acknowledge that this organization solely represented
the interests of a small business elite, while the chambers had
to restrict themselves to the representation of smaller com-
panies. The greatest concern of all other private sector groups,
however, was due to the vast concentration process that was ex-
pected to be accelerated mainly for the following reasons. The
lack of an organized capital market had reinforced the family-
owned nature of industrial concerns. Banks, which in theory were
the common source of financing for both industrialists and
commercial groups, favored the latter that did not insist on
long-term low interest rates. Holding companies, such as members
of TUSIAD, were able to attach different sources which were only
available to them . In addition, from the early seventies on-
wards , holding corporations started to buy up banks in order to
finance their investment so that by 1980 all major holding com-
panies owned or controlled at least one bank. The acquisition of
banks was facilitated by several changes in legislation during
the 1970s. Furthermore, international linkages enabled large
companies to attach inofficial foreign exchange markets abroad.
As the quota allocations became increasingly restrictive, holding
companies found it advantageous to earn their own foreign ex-
change through diversification towards exporting firms. This
tendency was even fostered by the government which allowed export
companies to retain a part of their foreign exchange earnings.
Apart from that, there was no doubt that Turkish exports (im-
ports) have been always subject to underinvoicing (overvoicing).
Given the unreliability of the quota allocations, the fast grow-
ing holding companies were forced to have a built-in-tendency
towards export orientation.- 92 -
In the mid-1970s, the large commpanies organized in TUSIAD
constituted a pressure group which was more homogeneous, smaller
by group members and economically more powerful than the
chambers. TUSIAD became generally accepted as a second private
sector organization . The growth of the large holding companies
was accompanied by a process of concentration, which altered the
balance of power between the competing groups of the private
sector. In fact, there was a tendency towards monopolization, so
that by 1981 among the 1800 types of domestically produced pro-
ducts 1100 were manufactured by one company and 300 were produced
by less than 5 firms, while competition was only prevailing in
the food and textile sector . The burden of the monopolization
was first felt by merchants depending totally on the supply of
the domestic industry. Large industrialists were accused of using
their dominant position in the market not to satisfy demand but
118 reduce production and increase prices .In particular, the
Istanbul Chamber of Commerce adapted a more populist tone com-
plaining about monopoly organization and inefficiencies resulting
from import substitution and the increasing concentration of
capital. The way by which this criticism was directed at TttSIAD
using phrases adopted from radical-leftist circles was intended
to mobilize the Anatolian chambers which basically raised similar
119 concerns
The very early signs of upcoming interest in trade liberalization
were observed when Turkey had to adjust its tariff and quota
system as prescribed in the association treaties with the Euro-
pean Community. On the one hand, the TUSIAD members were
enthusiastically promoting the idea of a common market as being a
part of Atatiirk's way of westernization. On the other hand, the
Anatolian chambers such as the Ankara and the Eski^ehir Chambers
of Industry wanted to preserve what they called their "own eco-
nomic identity" by promoting domestic machine building instead of
ordering turnkey projects and opening the country to the
120 so-called "international monopoly capital" . In 1974,
industrialists within the UCT founded the inofficial Union of
Chambers of Industry, which was meant to represent small and
medium-scale industries, as they were mainly organized in the
Anatolian chambers.- 93 -
However, the support extended by all industrialists to import
substitution was still general until the end of the seventies.
When Prime Minister Demirel criticized industrialists on the
121
ground of hiding behind protectionist barriers . In this re-
spect, he was only supported by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce,
which kept arguing that^ industries protected by trade barriers of
122 the order of 150 percent could not possibly export . In the
same vein, the World Bank objected against overprotection of
Turkish manufacturing industries prefering tariffs to the politi-
123 cally charged quota system
It was again the Eskisehir Chamber of Industry that replied to
these arguments maintaining that without the barriers the Turkish
124 industry would be incapable of surviving . This was confirmed
by the Union of Chambers of Industry in its proposals for the
Fourth Five Year Plan. The Union asked for continued protection
on the basis that the number of industries capable of competing
125
on the world market were few . Hence, being aware of the pro-
tective elements of import substitution, large industrialists
were not eager to changes until 1977, when the 1977 import
program was delayed as a result of political cleavages and a lack
of foreign exchange reserves. Consequently, the Istanbul Chamber
126
of Industry began to question the premises of ISI
In addition, the large chambers of commerce became more radical
opponents, since quota allocations for importers had been com-
pletely stopped in February 1977 for 3 years. This was partly a
result of the concessions that the ruling JP had to grant to
Erbakan, whose NSP was to represent the Anatolian chambers in the
First National Front Coalition. The reduction of import quotas
was, of course, supported by all industrialists, who benefitted
127 from decreasing import competition . Furthermore, this policy
ended the discussion on a reduction of consumption levels, which
would have seriously affected the Istanbul Chamber of Industry,
particularly the consumer durable sector.- 94 -
Due to the stagnation of the economy, however, consumption levels
finally declined leading to huge overcapacities in the industrial
sector. Capacity utilization was further reduced by the reduction
of import quotas. The subsequent price increases and shortages in
intermediate and investment goods lowered the effective protec-
tion of the manufacturing industries, especially of those depend-
ing heavily on imports, such as the assembly industry. In this
respect, a leading producer of domestic appliances complained
about the high costs of domestically produced inputs hindering
128 all export facilities in his sector . Of course, this complaint
was mainly directed against the protection granted to SEEs and
Anatolian producers of intermediate products.
In this situation, many industrialists realized that a reform was
perferable to the main-stream policy of generously fostering
industry to expand capacity while restricting its access to raw
materials. Hence, the deterioration of the economy led eventually
TttSIAD to declare the import substitution strategy as the source
of all troubles, while it was cynical to note that much of the
129 blame was ascribed to the government . Nevertheless, in 1977
TUSIAD was not yet in a position to formulate concrete policy
proposals.
The division within the private sector was simultaneously re-
flected by political instability due to a lack of majorities in
the parliament and upcoming terrorism. After the 1970 stabili-
zation measures the JP had lost its monopoly with respect to
private sector representation, so that a RPP-NSP coalition was
formed after the elections of 1973. Anatolian businessmen had
been alienated by the policies of the JP favoring "big capital".
Hence, small businessmen turned towards some smaller parties,
mainly Erbakan's National Salvation Party, who had defected from
the JP in order to represent the Anatolian business circles
The division of the business groups, which was due to differences
in the questions of ISI, found the way into the parliament, were
the particular business groups were represented by respective
parties. Hence, the JP, the former representative of all business- 95 -
circles, was succeeded by a couple of smaller parties adding to
the instability in the political process.
Political instability was also due to the once-for-all deva-
luation. Demirel's experience with respect to devaluation created
a generally recognized slogan in Turkey, namely: "The government
that does a devaluation will fall" . Meanwhile, devaluations
had become a question of industrial protection. Given the highly
prohibitive protection granted to industries, a devaluation auto-
matically reduced net effective protection, since input prices
increased substantially while there was not much scope for rais-
ing output prices. Thus, the business community was divided on
the issue of devaluations, as some faced prohibitive and others
less than prohibitive protection.
The political competition between various business groups had a
considerable impact on the competition between political parties.
The RPP-NSP coalition agreed on an increased industrialization of
Anatolia by promoting heavy industries which was supported by the
biggest Anatolian Chambers, namely Eskesehir and Adana. This was
due to the compromise position, which was reached between small
and large industrialists. Nevertheless, TOSIAD did not refrain
from publicly criticizing the coalition being partly supported by
the less active Istanbul Chamber of Industry. All other chambers,
even the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce refused to join an anti-
13° government meeting organized by TUSIAD in April 1974 . TttSIAD
was not successful in removing Erbakan from politics. When the
RPP-NSP coalition dissolved, he entered the First National Front
Coalition with Demirel's JP. The relations between Erbakan and
large industrialists even worsened, as the NSP governed Ministry
of Industry tried to assume direct control of the import regime
by eliminating certain categories in the Liberalized List (No. 1)
and gaining direct supervision over the quota allocations. In
addition, the Union of Chambers of Industry and TOSIAD complained
about the way the Ministry of Industry allocated investment
certificates and government permits. Furthermore, industrialists
challenged the Fourth Five Year Development Plan stressing plans- 96 -
for the increase of religious school graduates, "National War
Industries" and heavy industries, all of them being Erbakan
projects. As a result, the JP identified itself with the com-
plaints of the assembly industry and the consumer durable sector,
while the NSP aimed at destroying or controlling these in-
dustries. Hence, the disputes between business circles were
reflected in the fragmentation of the government. In this
situation the private sector undertook its last attempt to re-
concile the existing factions in a so-called Turkish Free
Enterpise Council (Turk Hur Teyebus Konseyi), but it failed
mainly because of the opposition of the large Anatolian chambers.
Due to the support of industrialists' groups Demirel was able to
stabilize his position within the UCT, even though the private
sector expected another major devaluation that had been delayed
because of the 1977 elections. Despite earlier promises, the
National Front Coalition agreed on a devaluation which was to be
conducted after the elections. As this decision was objected by
most business groups, it was only TOSIAD which openly supported
the devaluation stressing the importance of having continuously
small adjustments instead of large once-for-all devaluations.
During the election campaign of 1977, TUSIAD in contrast to other
business groups supported Ecevit's RPP, which was very close to
the majority of seats. TUSIAD's position revealed that large
enterprises were even to put up with a social-democrat or socia-
list government provided that political stability was guaranteed
and Erbakan was removed from government. Hence, the RPP minority
government was immediately backed by TttSIAD, but it failed to
survive a vote of confidence. It was followed by the second
National Front government which, however, was splitted because of
inter-departmental and inter-party fights. The National Front
coalition was not virtually recognized by industrialists, as it
was made clear by members of TUSIAD and the Istanbul Chamber of
_ , • • 133 Industry- 97 -
The business-state relations did not improve when Ecevit assumed
power with the help of some independents and a few JP defectors.
Ecevit devalued the Turkish currency by 29% in March 1979 and
implemented a stage by stage stabilization program aiming at
short-run measures as devaluation and control of the money supply
134 as well as structural changes in the long-run . Although IMF
and European Community officials visiting Turkey met a number of
business groups in this crisis atmosphere in order to discuss
their own set of demands, the private sector was not in a
position to agree on a common policy. In January 27, 1979 the in-
dustrial chambers of Istanbul, Ankara, Eskisehir and the Aegean
region as well as the Izmir and Istanbul Chambers of Commerce
agreed on a recommendation package, that was presented at a meet-
ing with Ecevit. Following the suggestion of the Istanbul Chamber
of Industry, every group presented its own suggestions. Thus, the
Istanbul Chamber of Industry argued against a devaluation as
simply being inflationary, while there was a new consensus among
the other groups that once a steady flow of foreign exchange in
the form of aid and loans was obtained, a devaluation should not
be delayed
135.
Since Ecevit kept on waiting for the IMF to back him with funds,
his austerity package remained conceptual being opposed by every-
one, especially the Istanbul Chamber of Industry. In early 1979,
the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and other groups joined TUSIAD's
call for devaluation, but the opposing Istanbul Chamber of In-
dustry succeeded in blocking it. Being annoyed by the outcome of
the policies, TUSIAD started a campaign against the government
placing ads in daily newspapers . Ecevit tried to retaliate by
promising legal sanctions, but he fell in the 1979 by-elections,
in which the JP scored an impressive victory. The all-JP govern-
ment came to the relief of most business groups, especially
TUSIAD, since Erbakan's NSP remained excluded. Most industria-
lists, however, would have preferred a strong RPP-JP coalition
that would have dominated the parliament.- 98 -
By the end of 1979, there was a common consciousness on part of
most business groups that radical changes were needed to restruc-
ture the Turkish economy. This radical approach, which was also
supported by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry, was implemented by
Demirel and Ozal on January 24, 1980, as discussed in the first
chapter. Although Ozal recommended to disregard vested interests
of individual chambers or TUSIAD, decisive parts of the reform
package, such as the tax reform, were blocked in parliament,
while others, i.e. the financial reform, were simply disregarded
or circumvented by the business community. In addition, political
turmoil and excessive political strikes had become the prevailing
political problems. Thus, the implementation of the reform
package was delayed until the military intervention on September
12, 1980, which created an entirely new political environment as
trade unions, parties and other mass organizations were banned.
Hence, the UCT and its member chambers, which had always been in
close contact with politicians and their respective parties, were
isolated from the process of economic decision-making. TttSIAD,
however, quickly adjusted to the new circumstances, as it was
never allied with a particular party. The new military regime was
immediately backed by all leading industrialists who tried to
accommodate the relations with the military by contributing large
137 amounts to foundations associated with the armed forces . In
addition, it was helpful that Ozal became deputy prime minister,
since he and his family were members of TUSIAD. Hence, TUSIAD was
able to become the most dominant representative of the private
sector, merging the interests of industrial as well as financial
capital.
Facing the economic reform package the private sector eventually
splintered into three groups. The first one favored liberali-
zation enthusiastically backing Ozal, as they were well-posi-
tioned to take advantage of the export opportunities. Since most
of the small exporters had disappeared during the two decades of
excessive import substitution, this group comprised mainly hold-- 99 -
ing companies with a prominence of export orientation over import
substitution being involved in the textile and food stuff pro-
duction or in construction projects in the Middle East.
The second group encompassed mostly large holding corporations
which had either large inventories and financial resources or
banks at their disposal. Most of the early import substituting
firms, especially the assembly industry belonged to this group.
Owing to their financial resources they were in a position to
sustain losses even starting to export at losses and undertake
necessary adjustments. This group supported the military
government for providing political and economic stability.
Finally, the third group included mostly small and medium-sized
industrial companies that depended on the domestic market and
could not afford financial or trade policy reforms, as they were
not diversified. Many of those companies were to be hit by the
import liberalization of intermediate and consumer goods. Since
many of them, in addition, had depended on formerly subsidized
inputs provided by SEEs, there was a wave of bankruptcies
striking these companies, while the big holding companies made
use of this situation and bought them up.
The first two groups were mainly represented by TtlSIAD members
including holding companies from Anatolia. In contrast, the last
category consisted of the bulk of small companies organized in
the Anatolian chambers.
While it is obvious, for which reasons business groups may lobby
for increased protection and import substitution, their incen-
tives to argue for stepwise liberalization are not self-evident.
As long as a small number of producers benefitted from import
substitution, the burden of protection was to be sustained by the
society, as it is also argued by Becker (1983). As increasing
numbers of entrepreneurs shifted towards ISI, moreover advancing
into secondary import substitution including production of in-- 100 -
termediates, the rising costs of protection fostered opposition.
The costs of protection did also fall upon industrialists, espe-
cially the conglomerates. Table 5.4 shows that the rate of
capacity utilization in the Istanbul region, where most of the
TUSIAD members were located, was comparatively low. According to
questionaires collected -by the UCT, one of the main reasons was
138 the availability of inputs and intermediate goods
Most of the big holding companies actually faced the limitations
of the domestic market. Thus, once they were no longer able to
expand their domestic sales volume, they found the higher stages
of import substitution occupied by SEEs and Anatolian companies
and were therefore impelled to look elsewhere including exports
for further expansion.
In addition, an increase in the country's foreign exchange
position was the last resort for the powerful assembly industry
which increasingly became endangered by the lack of imported
inputs. Furthermore, trade liberalization was the only oppor-
tunity to get rid of local high-cost suppliers of intermediate
goods and raw materials. For many firms the general lack of
demand and the lack of imported inputs became a matter of
existence. The number of bankruptcies and the respective capital
involved reached a peak in 1978, as it can be obtained from Table
5.5 In 1978 and 1979, each year 77 bankruptcies have been re-
corded. The capital of the respective firms amounted to 124
million TL in current prices. Moreover, the average firm size
shows that in 1978 the wave of bankruptcies affected relative
large firms.
Unlike many smaller companies the larger holdings did not keep
their free-rider position adopting a policy of wait-and-see,
while simultaneously opposing every liberalization effort that
was likely to harm them. TUSIAD was the only organization, in
which detailed policy proposals were launched. Since the li-
beralization of the trade regime which was expected to cause high- 101 -
Table 5.4: Rate of Capacity Utilization in the Istanbul Region (Percent)
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costs of adjustment, compromises on questions of distribution of
these costs were more likely to be reached in small groups.
Being aware of their financial resources, the holding companies
were in a position to sustain transitional losses and buy up
small companies with export capacities. In some cases private
conglomerates were supported by the state, as unprofitable
daughter companies were taken over by SEEs. Due to their size and
degree of diversification, holding companies could afford to
expose themselves to the risks of liberalization and manufac-
turing exports. This was especially true for those conglomerates,
that had already attached inofficial sources of foreign exchange,
so that they virtually had already prepared necessary adjust-
ments. Given the exclusiveness of TUSIAD, it was easier to over-
come the free-rider problem, even though the members differed
with respect to sectors and levels of horizontal diversification.
5.2 The Collusion of Interests leading to Trade Liberalization
Towards the end of the seventies the interest groups were
extremely divided on the issue of trade liberalization in general
and on the way it was to be implemented. The military had a more
general interest in improving the business climate, especially
the hopeless balance of payments situation and the political
unrest. The bureaucracy was paralyzed because of its affiliation
with the political parties, with the exception of a small techno-
cratic elite, which was not yet politically influential. Landed
interests were divided into potential exporters and inward-
oriented producers. Foreign creditors strongly advocated a trade
liberalization leading to an export-oriented structure of the
economy. Due to the economic bargaining power, the foreign cre-
ditors were in a position to insist on structural adjustments as
a part of their conditionalities. The trade unions were still a
militant supporter of secondary import substitution rejecting all
attempts that could possibly lead to real wage declines or unem-
ployment in the protected industries. Finally, the business
groups were split into the small number of large industrialists- 103 -
and the numerical majority of small producers. The division of
interest groups was also reflected in the party system. The RPP
was backed by the trade unions; the largest part of the bureau-
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cracy and the urban poor . The JP mainly represented the in-
terests of large industrialists and the commercial groups. Most
of the small industrialists, merchants and landed groups sided
140 with the smaller parties, especially the NAP and the NSP
Hence, the cleavages on trade liberalization added to the poli-
tical splintering in parliament. Since the foreign creditors did
not release any fresh money until the first steps of a trade
liberalization were implemented, there was no opportunity to opt
for continuing ISI, as it had been in the 1970s.
The division of pressure groups and political parties hindered
the decision-making process. Hence, democratic governments did
not succeed in carrying through their concepts of trade liberali-
zation. This situation changed, as the military assumed power and
banned all existing political parties. Groups with political
power depending heavily on representation in parliament were
immediately excluded from the decision-making process, as there
were trade unions, landed interests, the lower ranks of the
bureaucracy and the small Anatolian chambers. In contrast, large
industrialists and the technocrats became more dominant.
The military reached its primary objective, as it succeeded in
restoring "law and order". In this respect it was supported by
all pressure groups, though they were partly directly affected by
141 the harsh security measures . As far as economic reforms were
concerned, the authoritarian government depended on the techno-
crats and the large holding companies.
Hence, it was more than coincidence that the military and later
the Ozal government's liberalization policies fitted TUSIAD's and
the technocrats' attitudes:- 104 -
- The underground economy, especially the inofficial money and
foreign exchange market formerly known as the "Second Central
Bank" was abolished making extensive use of the security
forces.
- The tax reform as well as the land reform were passed, as it
had been proposed in earlier TUSIAD reports
- The financial reform including the bank reform, did not re-
strict the oligopolistic behavior of banks owned by large
holding companies. Hence, gentlemen's agreements among the re-
spective banks to control the interest rate were inofficially
acknowledged.
- The quota system which had been politically charged and subject
to abuse through corruption and favoritism was abolished, while
protection was given through tariffs, funds and subsidization.
The present trade system is comparatively liberal, as it is not
prohibitive by any means. Intermediate goods and raw materials,
however, have been much more liberalized, while there is still
considerable, though less than prohibitive protection for con-
sumer durables production and assembly industries.
This bias of the new trade regime is revealed in Table 5.6, which
shows the nominal tariffs and taxes charged only for imports.
Basic inputs and intermediate goods are subject to a comparative-
ly lower nominal tariff protection than consumer durables and
machinery. Agricultural products have the lowest nominal tariff
production, though it has to be noted that some products are not
eligible for importation. The highest protection is given to the
former assembly industries in the consumer durables sector, which
is well represented in TOSIAD. Consumer durables are among the
products, which are subject to a specific or ad-valorem payment
into funds. This shows that despite of the shift from import
substitution to export orientation there is a systematic bias in
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It has be be noted that it was not the military which favored
export-orientation. In contrast, as a result of the first
liberalization measures in 1981 the military-Owned OYAR suffered
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serious losses . In this respect the army certainly had a dis-
inclination towards trade liberalization. However, being a member
of TUSIAD, trade liberalization became the only feasible economic
policy, after the trade unions and the chambers had been
weakened.
Although it was still hard to find evidence for TUSIAD's involve-
ment in the implementation of the reform package, it cannot be
denied that especially companies represented by this organization
managed to turn out as winners as compared to others. This became
especially evident, as TUSIAD successfully lobbied for a rescue
fund, which was to support large companies during the banking
crisis in 1982. As Ozal refused to support this idea, he was
144 heavily attacked by TUSIAD and finally was forced to resign
Since then, the power structures within TUSIAD has altered in
favor of export orientation. The "older" industrialists, who have
been a powerful group since the 1940s, are complaining that
Ozal's regime favors the "new" businessmen, who became powerful
especially after the liberalization. Their distinctive charac-
teristic is that they are all engaged in foreign construction and
export business in the Middle East. Especially, the construction
firms are accused of lobbying for increased investment in muni-
cipal infrastructure. Government procurement facilitates rent-
seeking, thereby increasing the inflationary deficits of the
municipalities have become the most important source of
inflation. This conflict, however, has not led so far to a
questioning of Ozal's export-oriented policy. Since 1984, the
so-called Extra-Budget-Funds (EBFs) have been of growing
145 importance for the fiscal system and the trade regime . The
EBFs participate in almost all tax and tariff revenues. The fund
revenues are distributed among several independent funds, which
are assigned specific purposes. The largest funds are used to
finance public investment in infrastructure (Public Participation- 107 -
Fund), fertilizer subsidies (Support and Price Stabilization
Fund) and subsidized home credits (Mass Housing Fund). Thus,
among the beneficiaries of the funds are the construction
industry and the agricultural sector. Even the military
participates in the EBFs, as investment in the domestic defense
industry is partly financed by a so-called Defense Industry
Support Fund.
Summing up, it can be concluded that the implementation of trade
liberalization reflects the interests of the country's leading
pressure groups, the military, the large conglomerates and the
high-ranking technocrats. The structural bias of trade libera-
lization can be explained by TtJSIAD's dominance in the business
sector. The technocrats were responsible for the implementation
of the reform package, which was to be performed in accordance
with the foreign creditor's conditionalities. The military can be
attributed a crucial role in the process of implementation as it
facilitated political decision-making by weakening the trade
unions and the UCT.- 108 -
6. Conclusions: The Transition from Import Substitution to
Export Orientation
6.1 The Implementation of Import Substitution Industrialization
The preceding sections have provided a record of the involvement
of interest groups in the process of economic decision-making in
Turkey. Looking at Chart 6.1, which is meant to summarize the
influence of pressure groups in respective periods, it can be
seen, how the particular vested interests determined the degree
of inward or outward orientation. It is assumed that policies are:
an outcome of interest group pressure neglecting other determi-
nants of policy-making. The vertical axis shows the percentage of
interest group pressure for export orientation or import substi-
tution regarding the devotion to one of those strategies as a
matter of 0-1 decision. The channels which move along the hori-
zontal time axis show, whether a group was lobbying for export
orientation or import substitution. Channels depicted below
(above) the horizontal axis show that the respective groups opted
for import substitution (export orientation). The vertical order
of channels does not reflect the degree of inward or outward
orientation of the particular group. In the same vein, the origin
of the vertical axis should not be associated with the geometri-
cal locus of neutral trade regime, which treats exports and im-
ports equally. The latitude of the channels indicate the per-
centage strength of a particular group. The percentages have been
derived using the following methods: Firstly, it was arbitrarily
decided whether the group was import substitution- or export-
oriented at a specific point in time. Secondly, for each point in
time, the most topical policy issues were chosen, while these
issues were not necessarily directly related to the policy alter-
natives given in the chart. If a group was in a position to push
through its interest on a specific subject it was given one
point. In case of a compromise position, only one half was
granted, while obvious defeats in political disputes were marked
with zero points. Adding up these points for particular groups
for specific points in time, gives the relative percentage
strength of a group vis-a"-vis the others.- 109 -- 110 -
The sum of the channels above (below) the time axis shows the
aggregated interest group pressure towards export orientation
(import substitution), which should be reflected in the actual
government policy.
Hence, if more than 50 percent of aggregated interest group
pressure is under (above) the time axis the government's policy
should reflect a dominance of inward over outward (outward over
inward) oriented policies. As it can be seen the actual policies,
as they have been discussed in earlier chapters, follow the major
thrust of interest group pressure. In the early 1950s, there was
a strong bias towards export orientation, even though this was
the beginning of import substitution in its unplanned fashion. In
1960, all groups except foreign creditors opted for import sub-
stitution, as this was the beginning of the planned period. This
conformity altered during the 1970s due to the emergence of new
groups when the attitudes of the importers and large industria-
lists changed, pressure towards trade liberalization was
enhanced. Industrialists and trade unions became stronger during
the period of planned import substitution. The military increased
its power considerably through coups, as they occurred 1960, 1971
and 1980. The military take-overs led to sudden shifts in the
percentage strength of particular groups. Sizeable organizations
such as land owners, trade unions and small business lost under
authoritarian rule, while they were able to gain during demo-
cratic periods.
The prevalence of a number of powerful groups challenges the
observations of post-marxists and exponents of the so-called
dependency theory. The basic presumption in marxist approaches is
the dominance of a so-called state-class, which is meant to be a
union of government officials and capitalists . In the same
way, Evans (1979) argues that the emergence of import
substitution industrialization is due to a coalition between
government, domestic capital and multinational corporations, of
which the latter played a minor role in Turkish politics.- Ill -
However, the dominance of a single group or stable coalition that
could push through its political demands vis-a"-vis all other
groups cannot be observed in the case of Turkey over time. This
has been also shown for Latin American countries . Especially,
government and business groups have experienced considerable
internal rivalry and clashes, while coalitions have been persist-
ing only in the short-run. The competition between groups did not
only erupt as a result of clashes on the degree of import sub-
stitution and outward orientation. Chart 1 shows that divergent
views within the ISI strategy led to the splitting of groups,
i.e. business, industrialists and trade unions. Thus, analyzing
the political economy of developing countries, there is a
fundamental difference between group competition within the
framework of a generally accepted policy and strategic compe-
tition geared towards the acceptance of a development strategy,
i.e. the choice between export orientation and ISI. In this re-
spect, game theoretical approaches of the political market suffer
148 from fundamental shortcomings . Firstly, these models have to
assume the prevalence of a stable structure and a constant number
of interest groups (players). However, these conditions may not
be found in developing countries, which do not face a stable tra-
ditional institutional framework as in developed democracies.
Secondly, the number of interest groups is generally larger than
two or three, as it is assumed in game theory. Hence, such games
might reveal answers for specified political markets in the
short-run. The relationship between interest group pressure and
ISI or liberalization, does not allow for the omittance of one of
the many groups (see Chart 6.1), since it involves long-run
analysis. Hence, there was considerable competition among indivi-
dual groups, though certainly not perfect competition as assumed
in models of the neoclassical political economy.
In contrast to models of the political market there was not any
considerable opposition against the implementation of ISI. The
lack of opposition can be mainly attributed to the timing of
implementation. According to Hirschman (1971) there are four
distinct origins leading to an implementation of ISI, namely- 112 -
wars, balance of payments difficulties, growth of the domestic
market as a result of export growth and official development
policy. The latter three seem also to apply to the situation in
Turkey at the end of the 1950s. The balance of payment diffi-
culties, which marked the end of the period of export orientation
in primary commodities, were due to declining external demand.
The very first import barriers on consumer goods were ad-hoc
measures that were purely defensive in nature. The government had
no clear idea on ISI, while during the mid-fifties business in-
terests and landed groups still favored export-oriented policies.
However, the protection facilitated unplanned import substi-
tution. Merchant capital, producers of export goods and landed
interests started to engage in these new industries, thus becom-
ing a powerful lobby for protection after a few years. Hence, for
many developing countries, as Hirschman points out, balance of
payment difficulties lead to a bias towards non-essential in-
dustries, since the import of such goods is restricted first. It
took the new import substituting producers about 5 years to
achieve a strength, which facilitated them to lobby for planned
ISI. But it was not only the business group in general, which
sided with increased protectionism. At that stage there is a
broad confluence of interests between the landed class,
industrialists, importers, merchants, trade unions and
bureaucracy. Landed groups and merchants were interested in a
growth of domestic consumption, that was to offset the declining
external demand. Importers were seeking quota rents, while the
bureaucracy expected to improve its position through more
planning and state intervention. Although these groups have
competed in the distributional struggle, there was a broad
consensus concerning the inward orientation of the economy.
Thus, the implementation of ISI is almost inevitable for develop-
ing countries, once governments have implemented protectionism as
a short-run cure to balance of payments difficulties. In both
East Asia and Latin America protectionist policies associated
with the first stages of import substitution were strongly
149 championed by local industrialists and bureaucratsBibliothek
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There are only very few exceptions namely Hong Kong and Singa-
pore, where ISI could not transpire. This is due to the lack of a
sizeable domestic market and the vested interests of entrepot
traders. This special form of export-import trade may only work
in a totally liberal non-protectionist environment, while due to
their location these traders do not have promising alternatives
in the case of an export crisis.
In contrast, export-import merchants and export traders in Turkey
became importers or importer-industrialists. In the same vein,
manufacturers of exports and landed interests became inward
oriented during this process of adjustment. This flexibility
seems to refute the argument, that import substitution is needed
to develop a national entrepreneurial drive. Thus, in practice, a
massive discrimination of exporters did not occur, as they were
ready to adjust in order to benefit from the more profitable ISI.
Static trade theory also presumes that consumers as a strategic
group are likely to challenge ISI for price-raising effects.
Nevertheless, even in the most liberal and democratic periods of
ISI, which fostered the establishment of numerous mass organi-
zations, a consumer-oriented pressure group was not organized.
The reason is that most consumers in developing countries are
suppliers of labor and capital. It is much more efficient and
effective for individual consumers to engage in trade unions,
business groups and other professional associations. Thus, the
implementation of ISI did not result in political conflicts in
Turkey. In this respect the implementation was quite similar in
Latin America and East Asia.
6.2 Politico-Economic Determinants for the Crisis of ISI
The distortions associated with ISI lead to substantial rents for
the domestic industry, which thereby becomes increasingly
stronger both politically and economically. In contrast to
industrialized countries, protected industries engaging in
political lobbying did not decline in Turkey . This is related- 114 -
to the following reasons: As the government offers continuous
protection, the rent-seeking industries earn supernormal profits.
These rents can be reinvested into additional lobbying activities
and real capital for import substitution. Thus, as a consequence
of the rent-seeking activities the production of import substi-
tution goods, i.e. capital-intensive production, becomes increas-
ingly profitable over time. The attractiveness of import sub-
stitution causes a spread effect, which goes beyond the initial
producers of import-substitution goods. Other companies catch up
looking for market niches which have not been yet occupied by the
first generation of industrialists. The extent of the spread
effect depends on the barriers-to-entry on the political market
for protection. Under a pluralist democratic regime the
barriers-to-entry are lower, since even small companies can
organize themselves and engage in rent-seeking. In contrast,
under authoritarian rule the barriers-to-entry are substantially
higher limiting the number of rent-seeking firms. When ISI has
accomplished a high vertical and horizontal extension, protection
will be viewed as a quasi-property right . Hence, the longer
the duration and the broader the implementation of ISI, the more
opposition a government will face in getting rid of it.
The duration of ISI is partly a function of the foreign exchange
constraint, since industrialization, i.e. ISI, heavily depends on
imports of intermediate inputs and machinery. In an economy,
which only consists of a manufacturing sector turning from
export-orientation towards import substitution, this constraint
will be reached in a very short time. As excessive ISI reduces
foreign exchange earnings considerably, the growth of the in-
dustrial sector especially import substituting industry declines.
This is one of the so-called self-liquidating effects inherent in
ISI. Hence, in this case the manufacturing sector is obliged to
realize its export opportunities in order to finance the ex-
pansion of domestic industries including import substituting
producers. All of the East Asian NICs, with the exception of Hong
Kong, passed such an adjustment using protection to develop in-
fant industries even after the shift to an export-oriented stra-
152 tegy- 115 -
The switch to an export-oriented industrialization strategy will
be delayed, when the country has other foreign exchange earnings
than exports of manufactured goods. In the case of Turkey, the
crisis of import substitution was delayed considerably by the
remittances of foreign workers and agricultural exports. Since
early stabilization programs such as the 1970 program, included
depreciations of the currency which resulted in considerable
increases of foreign currency earnings, imports of necessary
inputs could be sustained and there was no need to abandon ISI.
For industrialists, it was less costly to lobby for the allo-
cation of foreign exchange earnings than for a change of policies
towards export orientation. Such policy shifts and a subsequent
structural adjustment of manufacturing production were only ini-
tiated, when sustained growth of protected industries reached
such a high need of foreign exchange that could not be provided
by the more or less stagnating traditional exports. This bottle-
neck was aggravated when the oil shock reduced the foreign ba-
lances in real terms. However, countries that can rely on steadi-
ly increasing foreign exchange revenues from traditional exports
(such as was the case with oil producers) will not easily shift
from import substitution to export orientation.
A foreign exchange shortage is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for the abandoning of ISI. Another is related to a
gradual deterioration of the political and economic situation
associated with ISI. Hirschman argued that the ultimate crisis of
ISI is not caused by failures associated with the implementation
of ISI but rather reflects political and institutional deficien-
cies . Looking at the Turkish experience in the 1970s, it seems
reasonable to assume that such deficiencies were closely related
to economic phenomena and incentives created by ISI itself. As it
can be easily seen from Chart 6.1, the ISI period was charac-
terized by a division of lobby activities into numerous groups
and factions, while periods of export orientation show a tendency
towards integration of functional interest groups, such as capi-
tal and labor. The growing diversion of interests under ISI made
it more difficult for governments to find acceptance, as the- 116 -
diversion of interests was immediately reflected in a highly
fragmented party system.
The splitting of groups resulted from increased regulation, in
which every small faction including small companies was in a
position to realize gains from rent-seeking. Business interests
eventually became divided over the degree and direction of import
substitution. Trade unions were splitted and became radical, as
they represented increasingly smaller groups of labor. Institu-
tions like the bureaucracy and the military, which are supposed
to be neutral, increasingly developed vested interests through
their own involvement in ISI. Hence, there is, in addition, a
political exhaustion of ISI.
Some authors argue that exhaustion of ISI is a result of invest-
ment in the production of increasing varieties of consumer goods
154 at the expense of investments in capital goods industries .< If
the latter could be avoided (industrial deepening), domestically
produced capital goods would substitute imports and prevent a
foreign exchange crisis. The implementation of such a policy
would require a stable political system guaranteeing the control
of the working class, preponderance of officials and technocrats,
and depoliticization of mass organizations. These requirements
would be met best by bureaucratic-authoritarian states.
This analysis does not fit to the case of Turkey. It is certainly
true, that a democratic environment strengthened political demands
by mass organizations. However, it was the democratic process
which enabled smaller and medium-sized companies of the Anatolian
chambers to produce capital goods and intermediate inputs. These
were exactly the groups which were discriminated by military rule
in 1970 and 1980. The Turkish conglomerates had refrained from
deepening on a large scale since the mid 1970s. In this respect
large private companies behaved differently as compared to those
in Latin American countries. In the case of Turkey "deepening"
was conducted by SEEs and smaller companies, while secondary
import substitution in general added to the exhaustion of ISI.- 117 -
6.3 Political Factors Affecting the Timing and Sequencing of
Liberalization
From the public choice theory it is obvious that the government's
willingness and ability to turn towards export orientation de-
pends on some preconditions. If the economic situation of a
country is in disarray and the government is in danger to lose
economic control completely, there will be some willingness to go
for reforms . The democratic government under Demirel, which
actually went for reforms had not much to lose. Firstly, the
government did not have a majority in parliament, so that it was
not expected to remain in office for a longer period of time.
Secondly, the government was in a dilemma, as it could choose
between a devaluation as envisaged in the IMF stabilization pro-
gram or a foreign exchange gap that would lead to a stop of all
imports and a fiscal breakdown. The Demirel government considered
the first alternative to be the less risky. Hence, one of the
preconditions for the implementation of a stabilization program
was the external crisis, i.e., the foreign exchange gap and the
overindebtedness. In this situation the foreign creditors had a
strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the Turkish government.
Nevertheless, the minority government did not have enough poli-
tical backing for the implementation of an entire stabilization
program. The structural aspects of such a program entailed con-
siderable political risk. Short-run immobility of labor and
capital could have caused a decline in real income and real
wages. In contrast to protectionism, trade liberalization accrues
costs to the interest groups, which are decisive in the policy
making process. While protection can be supplied in accordance
with the exclusion principle, overall liberalization has some
characteristics of a public good. Even if the groups are well
aware that liberalization may be needed to provide aggregate
welfare in the long-run, no group is willing to bear the short-
run costs. Thus, groups rather behave as free-riders expecting
other groups to carry the costs of liberalization. The free-rider
position makes it difficult for governments to formulate
generally accepted plans of timing and sequencing. In addition,- 118 -
the government faces an optimization problem, as it has to con-
sider to what extent short-run losses in welfare can be offset by
long-run gains. Weizsacker (1978) argues that electorates impute
present day economic conditions to the ability and willingness of
the present government to solve economic problems. Given these
difficulties associated with voting behavior strong democratic
governments with a comfortable majority or authoritarian regimes
may be positioned best to carry out a policy shift. The former
can afford short-run losses in popularity and subsequent losses
of votes, so that their time-horizon under rational behavior
should be long-run. However, the case of Turkey shows that during
the exhaustion phase of ISI democratic governments lack the
support of stable majorities in parliament, since the interest
groups become extremely divided. Chart 6.1 clearly shows that in
1979 there was a balance of power between groups favoring
export-oriented policies and groups proposing ISI. This balance
of power, which doomed the democratic government to impotence,
was disturbed by the military coup.
The primary aim of the military in Turkey was to end the politi-
cal crisis, i.e. strikes, terrorism and the political impotence
of the government, while economic reforms were of secondary im-
portance. Chart 6.1 shows that despite the military's modest
preference for ISI, the coup actually facilitated the implemen-
tation of structural reforms and stabilization programs.
Authoritarian regimes, which suspend a democratic constitution,
are by definition independent of short-run voting-power. When an
authoritarian government takes over, large pressure groups exert-
ing voting-power become less influential relative to small and
exclusive groups, which lack voting-power. Since the military
coup strengthened the small group of large industrialists rela-
tive to trade unions and small business, there was a shift in the
direction of interest group pressure. The trade unions and groups
of small business, which both had been advocating ISI, lost their
political influence, while the large industrialists who favored
export orientation, became the dominant interest group. Finally,
the military was even prepared to put up with a strategy of ex-
port orientation provided that political stability was restored.- 119 -
Thus, the change in the political regime was only a necessary
condition for the implementation of trade liberalization. The
more crucial condition is the change in the political power of
interest groups in general and business groups in particular.
The ability of any government to induce reforms is dependent on
the business groups' willingness to carry through structural
adjustments. In politics as well as in economics, adjustments
will occur only as long as the private returns exceed private
costs. Otherwise, the free-rider problem will prevent adjustment.
North (1979) concludes, that for this reason only small, powerful
and exclusive groups were able to foster adjustments in history.
As it was mentioned before, individuals behave as free-riders
facing the costs of liberalization. However, small and exclusive
groups may solve the free-rider problem through negotiations, as
they are more likely to reach a compromise position on the shar-
ing of the costs of adjustment. In Turkey, TWSIAD was a forum, in
which such negotiations took place resulting in concrete policy
proposals. Government that were looking for the support of in-
terest groups, could rely on these proposals. It is interesting
to note that TUSIAD did not only comprise export-oriented com-
panies but also capital-intensive firms, which had been formerly
advocating import substitution. The common characteristic of
these firms is their high dependency on foreign exchange, im-
ported intermediate inputs and machinery. When secondary import
substitution threatened the availability of foreign exchange and
industrial imports, these firms became less profitable and con-
sequently turned against ISI.
The bulk of small companies in UCT did not come up with a clear
position on questions of liberalization. Small and medium-sized
companies opted for the status-quo and opposed attempts to reduce
industry protection. Hence, the sequencing of trade liberali-
zation and the export-oriented adjustment have been reflecting
the dominance of the large conglomerates. Protection has been
substantially reduced for raw materials, intermediate products
and machinery, while the consumer durable sector, which is well- 120 -
represented by TUSIAD, is still heavily protected. In the same
vein, the liberalization of the internal capital market has been
delayed. An important feature of the large holding companies was
the rich endowment with financial resources which enabled them to
finance necessary adjustments and losses in their import sub-
stituting daughter companies. Hence, one of the preconditions for
liberalization was the regulation of financial markets by gentle-
men agreements , from which large industrialists benefitted.
In contrast, rigidities on the labor market were solved by regu-
lations replacing the collective bargaining process. As trade
unions were weakened through the military coup, they were not in
a position to oppose the mandatory fixing of nominal wages. Given
the inflationary pressure, real wages have been declining thereby
supporting the process of adjustment.
6.4 The Political Viability of Export Orientation
After the 1984 liberalization program, the Turkish economy and
exports became much more export-oriented. The present pattern of
production now resembles that of East Asian NICs and has little
in common with patterns prevailing during the period of the 1950s
or the import substitution during the period of the 1960s and
1970s. However, it has to be noted that the present trade regime
is by far more restrictive than the liberal regime at the begin-
ning of the 1950s. Nevertheless, this goes in harmony with the
political experience of the East Asian success stories, as those
countries kept systematic protectionism even during their export
orientation phase.
The adjustment process was easened by an export boom to the
Middle East and North Africa. Especially the war between Iran and
Iraq fostered Turkey's position as an exporter. The question
remains, to what extent declining export demand may lead to a
reversal of export orientation. Such a reversal seems to be less
likely than in the 1950s, since the composition of Turkish
exports has become increasingly diversified featuring traditional- 121 -
exports such as agricultural products, processed food and tex-
tiles as well as construction, tourism and consumer durables. For
this reason, Turkey is no longer likely to suffer from a balance
of payments crisis as a result of declining export demand.
However, it has to be questioned whether this diversification of
exports has altered the political power structure. The newcomers
among foreign exchange earners, namely tourism and construction,
can also survive in a protectionist environment, so that it can-
not be expected to form strong anti-ISI lobbies. The conglo-
merates have become increasingly export-oriented, though. They
have to export in order to meet their foreign exchange require-
ments for imported inputs. Hence, the structural adjustment of
the economy reflects the new relative prices introduced by the
new policy regime. However, the question remains, to what extent
the society as a whole has changed. Despite major changes in
political and economic life in Turkey, there is still a con-
sistency across time, as far as interest groups are concerned.
When the return to democracy will be completed, the UCT and more
important trade unions are likely to regain power. Likewise, the
old political structure, as it was reflected in the party system
of the seventies, is still present. Ozal's party, for instance,
encompasses the old JP and NSP. In the same vein, most of the
other parties, which have been newly founded after the military
coup, consider themselves as heirs of former parties. However, it
is not likely that these grouping can challenge the present poli-
tical system, since the present election code favors large
parties relative to smaller ones. Hence, small vested interests
are excluded from parliament, while governments are supported by
stable majorities
Finally, it has to be asked, what kind of institutional
mechanisms can restrict excessive protection of specific in-
dustries. The answer has to remain tentative taking account of
the fact that institutional mechanisms are a function of interest
group pressure. There are a few measures which provide incentives
for a restriction of protection. Some of them have been applied- 122 -
during the adjustment process in Turkey. The most important
mechanism is the exchange rate regime, which is charged with a
high political burden. Thus, it has to be ensured that the
determination is free from political impact. This can only be
provided by a system of managed floating, which is easier to
implement in periods of export orientation, since it benefits
exporters. Such an exchange rate regime is still to be imple-
mented in Turkey in order to prevent the overvaluation of the
currency.
Furthermore, some means have been applied in Turkey to restrict
future tariff increases. The bulk of the Turkish tariff revenues
goes into funds, with which housing, investment in infrastructure
and subsidization of agriculture are financed. Thus, the con-
struction industry, landed groups and the bureaucratic managers
have an interest in high fund revenues. These groups have an
incentive to lobby for the optimum level of fund duties, which
maximize the amount of fund revenues. Hence, an evasion by non-
tariff barriers as well as prohibitive protection can be excluded
due to the pressure of these groups
In such an institutional framework the pressure of tariff-seeking
groups can be partly offset by revenue seeking groups, thus add-
ing to the stability of the import regime. The idea is to create
systems, where countervailing interest group pressure leads to a
stable institutional framework. Another example of such regu-
lations is the present tax system in Turkey. Before 1980 most of
the small businessmen were in a position to circumvent taxation
by recording less than actual turnover. The new personal income
tax scheme allows consumers to deduce their consumption from the
tax base within specified limits. Tax deduction is granted, when
the bills are presented to the authorities. Hence, consumers have
an incentive to collect bills, thereby limiting the volume of
inofficial sales, since the duplicate of the bills form a basis
of taxation of small businessmen and traders.- 123 -
The recent experience in Turkey shows that arrangements, as the
tax and the tariff system, prove to be stable, even though they
provide some other opportunities of abuse. Hence, policy measures
have to be embedded into institutional schemes that resistant to
interest group pressure. The invention and analysis of such
schemes should be given more attention in further research, since
they may help to stabilize the political process of export-
oriented adjustment.- 124 -




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sources: OCT (1983), Turkey Through Statistics During the Republican Era; Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1985.- 125 -
Table A2: Inflation Rates 1957-1984































Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, various issues.- 126 -

























































































































































































































Source: Pick's Currency Yearbook, World Currency Yearbook, various issues.- 127 -
Table A4: Turkish Cabinets Since 1950










































Coalition of RPP and AP formed
under pressure from outgoing
military
Majority coalition of RPP with




JP majority cabinets, recon-
stituted after 1969 elections
Non-partisan cabinet installed
by military





(JP, NSP, NAP, RRP), 222:218
confidence vote
Minority government loses con-:
fidence vote
Second National Front coalition
(JP, NSP, NAP) wins 229:219
confidence vote
RPP cabinet including three





Installed after MP wins
211:188 majority in November
elections; November 1987
elections boost the majority
to 292:158
Note: For Abbreviations see Table- 128 -
Table A5: Share of Exports by Items, 1965-1983
1. Agricultural Products
- Cereals







- Textiles and Clothing




- Rubber and Plastic Ind.
- Petroleum Products
- Glass and Ceramics
- Cement
- Iron and Steel Ind.
- Non-ferrous Metals Ind.













































































































Source: UN, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, various issues.










































Source: UCT, Economic Reports, various issues.- 129 -
Footnotes
1 A survey on prevailing doctrines and cross-country per-
formance is given in Krueger (1984). The latest study
differentiating between "good" policies and "bad" policies
has been undertaken by Krueger (1987).
2 See McCormick and Tollison (1981), p. 3.
3 For a survey of these models, see Baldwin (1985) and Quibria
(1986) .
4 A similar study on interest groups in Turkey has been recent-
ly published by Shams (1988) . However, his work is not based
on theoretical findings on interest group formation and group
behavior. Furthermore, he does not explicitly derive the
sources of power and interest patterns of pressure groups.
5 For a survey of quantitative analyses for industrialized
countries, see Anderson and Baldwin (1981). Estimates for
less developed and newly industrializing countries have been
made by Alikhani and Havrylyshyn (1982), Amelung (1987), Lee
Kiong (1985), Lachler (1986), Pangestu and Boediono (1984),
and Tan (1984). However, as these estimations are poor in
econometric terms, they do not allow for more than tentative
conclusions with respect to the political power of interest
groups and "endogenous" government behaviour.
6 The review of Turkey's development history presented below
draws on an extensive amount of primary and secondary sour-
ces. I will therefore refrain from citing specific referen-
ces. In general, it can be said that this chapter is partly
based on Giilalp (1985) and (1980), Ahmad (1977), £aglar
(1973), Sonmez (1980), Alpar (1974), and Keyder (1987).
7 See Ceylan, Sadi (1985), pp. 143-144.
8 Table Al in the appendix features growth rates between 1923
and 1983.
9 See Altinkemer (1986), pp. 8-10.
10 However, there had been no doubt that this new party was only
tolerated as a loyal opposition rather than as a competitor
to the RPP. See Yerasimos (1987), pp. 87-88.
11 See Bener (1968).
12 See Erogul (1977).
13 For further developments of the Turkish currency, see Table
A3 in the appendix, featuring overevaluation and all major
devaluations.- 130 -
14 This reform envisaged distribution of land to landless far-
mers, improvements in land tenancy and consolidation of badly
fragmented small holdings. See Saglam (1972), pp. 156-160.
15 For a detailed presentation of government programs see Ozturk
(1968).
16 See Aker (1968), p. 141.
17 Data on the inflationary development from 1957-1984 can be
obtained from Table A2 in the appendix.
18 Table A4 in the appendix provides a list of all Turkish
governments between 1950 and 1987, which is meant to assist
the reader in understanding the fluctuations in Turkish poli-
tical life.
19 See SPO (1963) .
20 See SPO (1967) .
21 See SPO (1969).
22 See SPO (1979).
23 A chronological list of all measures applied between 1980 and
1982 can be obtained form Sonmez (1982).
24 For an analysis of the negotiations between the Turkish
government and international organizations see Wolff (1987).
25 Rahmi Koc, the chairman of the largest industrial group in
Turkey put forward: "Before the 12 September coup we were
obliged to do everything under the democratic system. It
needed months to take decisions and pass legislations or
appointments. Thus, everything was only to be realized in a
very complicated way taking a long time, while everything was
regarded from the political viewpoint. The difference under
military rule is, that since there is no obligation to pass
decisions in parliament, it can act very quickly. In
addition, even if the military rule does wrong, it can
correct that in the short-run, because the military rule has
no worry, that it might lose votes and seats. The biggest
difference is that given right decisions in time there is a
very worth-while saving of time". See Cumhuriyet, 24 January
1982.
26 Table A5 and A6 feature the changes in the Turkish export
structure.- 131 -
27 A system of so-called "negative lists" allows for free im-
portation of all goods that are not explicitly mentioned in
the lists. In contrast, a system of "positive lists" prohi-
bits importation of goods not mentioned on the list. See UCT
(1984), pp. 190-192. According to the new lists mainly im-
ports of food stuff, textile and furniture are prohibited, as
it can be obtained from YKB (1984).
28 See Schick and Tonak (1987).
29 See SPO (1985), pp. 30-32.
30 A broad assessment of the military's business activities in
developing countries in general and in Turkey, Guatemala,
Indonesia, Egypt and Nigeria in particular is given in South
(March 1988), pp. 9-17.
31 The military contingent in the assembly declined from about
15 to 20 percent in the Eighth Assembly (1946-50) to 4 per-
cent in the Tenth Assembly (1954-57). Similarly, the per-
centage of cabinet ministers with a military background fell
from 30 or 35 percent to 15 percent, while there was not a
single military figure in the cabinets of the Tenth Assembly.
See Frey (1965), pp. 180-83, 280-82.
32 See Ozbudun (1966), p. 21.
33 According to a study by Kislali 11.7 percent of officers were
sons of military men, 34.7 percent of civilian bureaucrats,
7.9 percent of industrialists and tradesmen, 5 percent of
workers, 13.3 percent of artisans and petty merchants, 14.2
percent of peasants and 12.9 percent of liberal professio-
nals .
34 According to Ozbudun (1966), p. 19, tax evasion in commerce
and industry was quite common, while peasants and landlords
were legally exempted from taxation.
35 Vaner (1987) provides a broader assessment of these clea-
vages. In his study the two groups are named "Neo-Kemalists"
and "Nasserists" in order to terminate their ideological
boundaries.
36 See Ozbudun (1966), p. 36.
37 See Dodd (1979), p. 145.
38 See Ozbudun (1966), p. 34.
39 In October 19 60, power was formally returned to an above-
party government encompassing high-rank bureaucrats and
technocrats. In addition, the composition of the Consti-
tutional Assembly reflected an RPP majority, which altered
the military's power. After the 1961 elections government was
taken over by a multi-party coalition.- 132 -
40 See Weiker (1963), pp. 143-146 for a broader discussion of
the relationship between the NUC and the peasants.
41 For a more detailed information concerning the industrial and
political activities of OYAK see Serozan (1986), p. 53. Since
OYAK was given the legal status of a foundation, it is
exempted from various kinds of regulation and taxation. An
analysis of organizational and legal features of OYAK can be
obtained from Aysan and Ozmen (1981).
42 See Saylan (1981), p. 194-195.
43 See Weiker (1981), p. 31.
44 Officially, the decisions on future development strategies
had to be determined by a so-called "High Planning Board"
(Yuksek Planlama Kurulu). In this institution there was a
balance of votes between politicians and bureaucrats, since
the former were represented by the Prime Minister and three
ministers, while the bureaucrats were represented by the head
of the SPO and three chiefs of the departments.
45 See Roos and Roos (1971).
46 See Saylan (1981), p. 196-197.
47 See SPO (1963), First Five Year Development Plan 1963-1967,
p. 117: "In view of the foreign exchange difficulties likely
to occur during the plan period, importance was attached both
to expanding exports and promoting import substitution".
48 See SPO, FFYP, p. 471. At that time, the imports that had
priorities with respect to development were put in liberali-
zation lists and their share had been 7 0% of total imports.
49 Evidence for these political demands can be obtained from the
First Five Year Development Plan, pp. 440-443 and 70-92.
50 However, the landlords in Anatolia should not be associated
with the "latifundistas" in Latin America. The ownership in
Turkey pattern clearly indicates that even the smaller
peasants cultivate their own piece of land, so that the
position of the landlords in Turkey is due to their political
leadership. Further aspects of rural societies in Turkey can
be derived from Kiray (1984), Margulies and Yildizoglu
(1987), and Tachau (1984), pp. 113-143.
51 Evidence can be obtained from an empirical study on voting
behavior by Ozbudun (1980).
52 See Dodd (1979), p. 130.
53 The following state agencies served as an instrument of price
support: Soil Products Office, Sugar Factories Corporation,
Agricultural Sales Cooperatives, Sumerbank, State Monopolies
(Manufacturing of tobacco products and alcoholic beverages)
and the Agricultural Credit Cooperatives.- 133 -
54 A broader analysis of the price support mechanism and its
inflationary impact is given in Ulusan (1980).
55 See Ulusan (1980), p. 126.
56 External debt amounted to 0.489, 0.557 and 0.610 billion US$
in 1959, 1960 and 1961 (see Statistical Yearbook of Turkey
(1963) , p. 349) .
57 See OEEC (1957), p. 10; OECD (1964), p. 39; OECD (1963), p.
50.
58 See OEEC (1961), p. 32; OECD (1964), p. 39.
59 In fact, the meeting in which this policy advice was to be
discussed did not take place, since it was interdicted. See
Mumcuoglu (1980), p. 382.
60 See Gumriikcu (1984), p. 454.
61 See Sayba?ili (1976), pp. 123-124.
62 See Chap. 2, Section 3 and 4.
63 See Saybasili (1975), p. 224.
64 See Oncii (1980) , p. 466
65 Commercial importers were essential wholesalers who would act
as intermediaries by buying goods abroad and distributing
them nationally.
66 See Oncii (1980), p. 467.
67 Evidence is available from numerous quotations in bulletins,
the Istanbul Chamber of Industry issued those days, for in-
stance ICI (1956).
68 See Alexander (1960), pp. 353-358.
69 This quotation is derived from the UCT's 1964 recommendations
regarding the First Five Year Development Plan, as given in
UCT (1964), p. 84.
70 See Bener (1968), p. 187.
71 For data sources, see Table 4.3 on page 68.
72 Items on the so-called Liberalization List were freely
eligible for importation, as long as the central bank did not
experience a severe foreign exchange gap. Items, for which
the amount of foreign exchange available for importation had
been restricted, were on the Quota List. Goods not enumerated
on either lists were not eligible for importation. Further
information on the functioning of the quota and licensing
system can be obtained from Krueger (1974), chap. 6.- 134 -
73 The radicalism within the Turkish armed forces is assessed in
a study by Vaner (1987), which cannot be given a broader
attention in the text.
74 See Vaner (1987), p. 255.
75 Since 1965 there was a close collaboration between the JP and
the moderate faction of the military. In addition, shortly
after the 12 March coup, Gen. Giirler is said to have tele-
phoned Demirel and told him: "We did not do this against you,
Siileyman Bey." (See Vaner (1987) and Ahmad (1977) for evi-
dence) .
76 See Heper (1984), p. 79.
77 See Dodd (1979), p. 145.
78 Payaslioglu (1978), provides an extended study of the close
interlinks between politicians and the SEE.
79 See Saylan (1981), p. 192-193.
80 See World Bank (1975), pp. 196-197.
81 See Dodd (1976), p. 126.
82 Evidence can be obtained from contemporary OECD country
reports, for instance OECD (1967), pp. 30-31.
83 The representatives of TUSIAD argued that "TISK's strategy is
unwisely aggravating class antagonism and jeopardizing
Turkey's chances of entering the Common Market with a
Western-style democracy". (See Bianchi (1984), p. 269).
84 DISK proposed the "Yugoslavian" model of industrialization,
while TISK favored a mixed economy encompassing the co-
operative, the state and the private sector. Both union
federations assigned the state sector the leading role in
heavy industrialization. See Giimrukcu (1981) , pp. 464-466.
85 See Alexander (1960), pp. 353-358.
86 See Barkey (1984a), Chapter 6 and 7.
87 The major parts of this program have been partly reprinted in
Eskisehir Sanayi Odasi (1981).
88 See also Gevgilili (1973), pp. 180-184.
89 See Barkey (1984b), pp. 55-56.
90 The Izmir Chamber of Industry publicly denounced Erbakan and
refused to recognize his presidency.
91 See Bianchi (1984), p. 256.- 135 -
92 See UCT Minutes (4/15/1970) .
93 The need for policy changes was stressed by Demirel in a
speech he gave upon a visit of the Istanbul Chamber of
Commerce, as it is given in the END published by the UCT
(1970).
94 See Sayba?ili (1976b).
95 See Bianchi (1984), p. 257.
96 In 1969 the Chambers of Industry had already managed to
create the Turkish Organization of Cooperating Chambers of
Industry (Tiirkiye Sanagi Odalari I^birligi Teykilati) , which,
however, proved to be short-lived.
97 See Vaner (1987), p. 255.
98 See Table 3.3 on page 55 for data on the distribution of
import shares between the public and the private sector.
99 This fragmentation weakened the polarization into radicals
and moderates. Officers alloted their respective inclinations
among almost all existing parties. The moderates distin-
guished into a left wing sympathizing with the new line of
the RPP, and a right wing close to the JP, the DP, the
Republican Reliance Party (RRP). The NMP collaborated with
the military radicalism on the right. Even Erbakan's NSP
nominated its own military candidates for the elections of
1973 and 1977. A broader analysis of intra-military conflicts
is given in Vaner (1987) .
100 In fact, the military was concerned about the cleavages.
Communique 6, addressed by General Evren on 12 September,
called upon all soldiers to respect the hierarchy. However,
the respect for military hierarchy was never explicitly
challenged.
101 The interests of large industrialists will be discussed in
Section 5.1.6. Meanwhile OYAK had boasted partnerships in
widely varying sectors including the automotive (OYAK-
Renault, MAIS A.S.), cement, petrochemicals (Petkim, Yasa?),
construction (OYAK-Kutluta?) , food (Pinar, Eti), electronics
industries (AES), as well as insurance, tourism and agri-
culture (Hekta?).
102 See Saylan (1981), p. 192-193.
103 See Heper (1984), p. 76.
104 Internal political problems are discussed in Aysan and Ozmen
(1981) .
105 See Heper (1984), p. 76.
106 See Saylan (1981), p. 193.- 136 -
107 Initially, the military chose to take action only against
those civil servants who were blamed for administrative
wrongdoings or a punishable offense. During the first week of
the regime only the extremist governors and mayors were re-
placed by more moderate bureaucrats or retired officers.
Between September 12, 1980 and September 12, 1981, a total of
18000 civil servants received administrative or penal punish-
ments. The next step was to retire as many civil servants as
possible (see Heper (1984), pp. 66-67).
108 See Sections 3.1.2 and 4.1.2 for evidence on the bureaucrats'
general interest in ISI.
109 Evidence can be obtained from Heper (1984), p. 80. Similarly,
the decision to join the EC was really made by three bureau-
crats. In fact, this shows a lack of predicatability in the
behavior of the civil bureaucracy in Turkey. Not only are
rules ununiformly applied, but they change frequently, since
critical decisions have not been the result of organizational
processes but the work of a few bureaucrats. This charac-
teristic of bureaucracy, which carries the flavor of the
Ottoman empire, is considered to be a Turkish phenomenon.
Thereby, the high-ranking bureaucrats become politicians
exposing themselves to struggles with the local bureaucracies
and the management of SEEs. As Dodd (1979), p. 140, correctly
mentions, this may be due to the conscious adaption of French
patterns in public administration. For field research on
these dynamics of the Turkish bureaucracy see Roos and Roos
(1971) .
110 See Sen (1979b), p. 91 and Sen (1979a), pp. 12-13.
111 Ozbudun (1980) provides a study on vote-shifting in the rural
sector.
112 See Wolff (1987), pp. 68-76.
113 Further information on the DCFE can be obtained from Schick
and Tonak (1987) .
114 For a more detailed discussion of the debt crisis see Wolff
(1987) and Schick and Tonak (1987) .
115 For instance project credits, that were derived from the
World Bank and allocated by the Industrialist Development
Bank of Turkey, required "certificates of promotion" as well
as 150 percent collateral on all loans, both of which only
holding companies were able to provide. See Oncu (1980), p.
474.
116 As a result of this accpetance TUSIAD was entitled to join
the official meetings between government and private sector
representatives (see Saybasili (1976b)).
117 Data are derived from UCT Minutes (2/18/1981).- 137 -
118 See Barkey (1984a), p. 149.
119 These complaints were made public in Cumhuriyet (June 6,
1973) by officials of the Izmir Chamber of Commerce.
120 These lines of argumentation are taken from articles in maga-
zines, such as Ertan (1973) and Kuciik (1973) .
121 See Eskissehir Sanayi Odasi (1981) , pp. 232-236.
122 See UCT (1978), pp. 75-76
123 See World Bank (1975).
124 See Eskisehir Sanayi Odasi (1981), p. 234.
125 See SOB (1976), pp. 26-28.
126 See Minutes (16.11.1977): "We created an industry that gulps
down foreign exchange".
127 See Minutes (19.1.1977): "Turkish industry has reached its
retrenchment stage. The main cause is importation. Imports
stand in opposition to industry. Chambers of commerce will
not defend industry, they are for imports".
128 See Kamhi (1980), pp. 98-100.
129 See also Barkey (1984a), p. 158.
130 The other parties favored by business groups were the follow-
ing: the fashist National Action Party, the Republican
Reliance Party, the Democratic Party and the Turkish Union
Party.
131 See Kurdas (1975), p. 28.
132 See Barkey (1984a), p. 193.
133 Ibrahim Bodur, head of the General Council of the Istanbul
Chamber of Industry and generally a pro-JP businessman, offi-
cially declared that they did not consider the government
serious enough to have a dialogue with". See Cumhuriyet,
October 20, 1977.
134 See TUSIAD (1978), p. 9.
135 See Eskissehir Sanayi Odasi (1981), pp. 316-317.
136 See, for instance, Cumhuriyet, May 16, 1979: "The only way to
produce a great deal and achieve a state of welfare is to
create incentives for a person in a system of competition.
With mandatory measures production cannot be increased. Only
the economic structure will get spoiled. Eventually the re-
gime will be transformed".- 138 -
137 In fact, there was a competition among businessmen with re-
spect to donations. The respective foundations, for instance,
the Foundation for Strengthening the Air Force (Hava
Kuvvetleri Guclendirme Vakfi), had been set up to foster the
modernization of the Turkish military.
138 The results of these questionaires on capacity utilization
are presented in the Economic Reports published annually by
the UCT.
139 Evidence on the supporters of the RPP can be obtained from
Samim (1987).
140 The _NAP and its supporters have been broadly analyzed by
Agaogullari (1987). A similar study on the religious right,
as it was organized in the NSP, has been done by Toprak
(1987).
141 Nevertheless, the support for the military was initially
general. This became evident in the constitutional election
in 1982, when about 93 percent of the population approved the
new constitution and confirmed Evren as President of the
Republic.
142 After the transition to democracy in 198 3 the landed groups
successfully lobbied against some measures of the land
reform.
14 3 In Cumhurriyet it was reported that OYAK initially suffered
serious losses due to the breakdown of the domestic market
and the abolition of prohibitive protection. The military-
owned automobile producer OYAK-Renault was even forced to
export at losses in order to survive this transitional
period.
144 The conflict between TUSIAD and Ozal erupted politically,
when Guney Sanayi, one of the leading textile producers, had
to declare bankruptcy. As it can be obtained from daily
newspapers, TOSIAD and the military supported ideas of
rescuing the conglomerate through state intervention.
145 Evidence on the EBF's source of revenues, administration,
projected and actual revenues can be obtained from the Resmi
Gazete (Official Gazette), which has recorded the establish-
ment of more than 50 EBFs since 1980.
146 Applications of the marxist approaches partly are surveyed by
Sellin and Topper (1981) and Simonis (1981).
147 Kaufman (1979) has shown convincingly that a broad range of
different coalitions supported early industrialization
efforts in Latin America.
148 For game theoretical applications to protectionism see Magee
and Brock (1982).- 139 -
149 Haggard (19 86a) provides similarities and differences with
respect to economic policy in Latin America and East Asia.
For a more detailed discussion of the East Asian cases see
Haggard (1986b).
150 According to Hillman (1982) senescent industries in in-
dustrialized countries face an environment, in which effi-
cient lobbying can only retard but not stop gradual decline.
151 North (1979) provdes a broader discussion on the formation of
property rights in economic history.
152 See Haggard (1986a).
153 For original statements see Hirschman (1971). More recent
quotations for the case of Turkey are available in Barkey
(1984).
154 See O'Donnel (1979) and Kaufman (1979) for a broader treat-
ment of the deepening process and authoritarian states.
155 See Lai (1987) for an elaboration of this subject.
156 The present election code, which was put into effect in 1983
under military rule and amended by the Ozal government in
1987, provides high barriers to represenation in parliament.
Political parties face thresholds of 10 percent of total
votes at the national level. In addition, there is an even
more restrictive threshold at the local level, which is 20,
25, 33 or even 50 percent depending on the number of seats,
which a province has in parliament. In practice, a relative
majority of 36 percent is sufficient to represent the
majority of seats in the assembly.
157 However, it has to be noted that interest group pressure may
also limit future tariff reductions. Furthermore, this system
has a built-in-tendency to be extended to other import items.
Since some funds participate in tax revenues, the equivalent
should apply to the determination of tax rates.- 140 -
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